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Organized labor through unions was prominent as part of the Progressive Era in the early 
twentieth century. Under the influence of the American Federation of Labor, groups such as the 
Women’s Trade Union League and International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union had active 
roles in New York City’s labor movement. Early policy favored mass strikes as a way to earn 
collective bargaining between workers and their employers. In 1909, a revolution swept the 
City’s garment trade when twenty thousand shirtwaist-making women walked out of their jobs. 
At the time, it was the largest gathering of women in American history. The WTUL and Local 25 
of the ILGWU joined forces in representing strikers and securing a fair agreement between 
workers and businesses. On March 25, 1911, one hundred and forty-six innocent factory workers 
died in the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire and the WTUL and ILGWU discovered their policies 
were not as strong as they had spent almost a decade believing. The following work examines 
the policies of the Women’s Trade Union League, the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ 
Union, and how the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike and Triangle Factory Fire effected these organizations 
and initiated new labor policies. Examining the impact of both events through newspapers, the 
words of organizers, and analysis of other historians affirms the WTUL and ILGWU changed 









The first person I need to thank is Mary Jane Auch. Without her book Ashes of Roses, I would 
never have connected with the Triangle Fire or written this thesis. I also want to recognized the 
work of Leon Stein. Leon Stein was a man who committed his life to the American labor 
movement. Thanks to his thorough investigation of the Triangle Fire, the facts of the disaster and 
its victims have a permanent place in American history. 
 
To my family: Thank you for supporting me through my entire academic career, especially my 
mother who has always supported my ambitious dreams. When I first told my father I was 
applying for a museum studies degree, he was skeptical. Through his original skepticism, he has 
had faith in my ability to overcome any challenge thrown my way. 
 
Thank you, Dr. Katrina Lacher, for taking on my project. You gave me the room to write and 
research on my own while pushing me to go deeper with my personal analysis of this topic. 
Thank you to the rest of my committee: Dr. Marc Goulding and Dr. Michael Springer. Your time 
is invaluable and I thank you for agreeing to follow my thesis writing journey!  
 
Finally, thank you to all of the women in the twentieth century who saw injustice in the labor 
system in the United States and did something about it. Your commitment to women workers 
















When I was in eighth grade, I read Ashes of Roses by Mary Jane Auch. The book follows 
the life of a young, Irish immigrant named Rose Nolan. Readers view her new life in New York 
City up until the day of March 25, 1911, when one hundred and forty-six people lost their lives 
in a fire at the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory located in the top three floors of the Asch Building. 
Before reading the historical fiction book, I had never heard of the Triangle Fire. As a fourteen-
year-old, I thought the fire was made up by the author to illustrate the perils of being a factory 
worker in the early twentieth century. It was only after I finished the book and used the internet 
to look up the fire that the reality of the event hit me. I was horrified when I discovered that girls 
my age burned and jumped to their death while trying to earn a living in the United States. Until 
that point, my history lessons had been about the image of the United States as a land of 
opportunity where anyone could pull themselves up by their bootstraps. From the time I looked 
at the pictures of the fire and read Leon Stein’s book The Triangle Fire, I have been fascinated 
with the Triangle Fire as well as American labor history. 
Leon Stein was the first historian to do in-depth research and writing about the Triangle 
Fire. His book, The Triangle Fire, was first published in 1967. Stein was involved as a writer and 
editor of Justice, the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union newspaper, for thirty-eight 
years. He was also the editor of a book of short labor stories called Out of the Sweatshop. In The 
Triangle Fire, Stein uses a narrative approach to address the event. Stein conducted interviews 
with survivors, city officials, and the families of victims to create a story full of first-hand 
accounts of what happened during the fire and at the trial that followed. A variety of articles 
from different newspapers across New York City are also quoted throughout the narrative. The 
author attempts an objective stance, but it is clear Stein thinks the factory owners and the 
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building owner, Joseph Asch, were the people responsible for the disaster. Leon Stein’s 
gathering of primary sources has led the way for future historians interested in exploring the fire 
and its consequences. 
 David Von Drehle’s book, Triangle: The Fire That Changed America, centers on the 
involvement of the political machine Tammany Hall in the Triangle Fire and America’s labor 
movement. Von Drehle directs the focus of readers to background players involved in the labor 
movement in the early twentieth century. The author notes that following the fire, Tammany Hall 
became more progressive. Democratic candidates put into office had to offer platforms based on 
labor reform, because the machine’s large majority of immigrant voters would no longer ignore 
unsatisfactory working and living conditions. 
The Triangle Fire, the Protocol of Peace, and Industrial Democracy in Progressive Era 
New York by Richard A. Greenwald analyzes a different side of the Triangle Fire. As the title 
suggests, Greenwald establishes and then discusses the relation between the Triangle Fire and the 
1910 Protocol of Peace championed by Louis Brandeis and the ILGWU. Throughout the book 
Greenwald writes about how labor organizers in the Progressive Era began creating new labor 
reforms and pushing the bounds of industrial relations. Greenwald argues that labor 
organizations still use daring new approaches to organize today. 
 Other historians including Jo Ann Argersinger and John F. McClymer have taken a more 
educational route while continuing Stein’s narrative style of explaining the fire. Their goals are 
to inform readers about the Triangle Fire and its continued contemporary importance. The 
authors use primary source documents such as newspapers and then walk readers through how to 
analyze and interpret the sources. Both authors present a chronological narrative, which aims to 
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teach young students and emerging historians the place of the fire in American history as well as 
the importance of primary sources for the historical field. 
Flesh and Blood so Cheap by Albert Marrin discusses all of the main points typically 
discussed with the fire, but the author also takes time to explore the background and lives of 
immigrants who worked in New York City factories. In researching their ethnic backgrounds, 
Marrin includes poems, songs, etc. that were important to immigrants as well as their 
experiences with life and leisure. Holding on to songs from their life before America and sharing 
them with other immigrants allowed them to bond over their homeland while learning the culture 
of their new home. Day to day factory life wore workers down, but the invention of movies and 
the creation of parks around the city gave immigrants the chance to relax after being shut up in a 
sweatshop or tenement. At the end of his work, Marrin also discusses organized crime in the 
garment industry and the rise of sweatshops overseas. In looking at sweatshops overseas, Marrin 
presents the argument that tragedies like the one at Triangle are what force developing countries 
to make improvements. Marrin briefly explains his personal belief that tragedy is a full-circle 
event that individual countries must experience rather than a global problem that can be solved.  
The majority of works over the Triangle Fire touch on the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike, but 
there are not many that solely focus on the strike. One book that does is We Shall Not Be Moved: 
The Women’s Factory Strike of 1909 by Joan Dash. Dash’s book informs readers about the 
purpose of the protest and its place in American history. In doing so, Dash discusses all of the 
social classes involved including their race, religion, and political beliefs. While covering each 
class, Dash describes prominent individuals, and also relates what the girl strikers thought about 
the elite women who helped put them in the public spotlight. 
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My work adds a different perspective to the discussion of the Triangle Fire and its place 
in America’s labor history. The majority of research over the fire tells the same story with the 
same quotes and interviews. Instead of repeating what is already known, my research examines 
the effect the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike and Triangle Fire had on the policies and ideologies of the 
Women’s Trade Union League and the International Lady Garments’ Workers’ Union. Prior to 
the fire, these two groups used mass strikes as the preferred method for gaining collective 
bargaining for their members. The Shirtwaist Strike was a milestone in women’s labor history, 
yet many of the women who struck for months were killed a year later at the Triangle Factory by 
what they tried to prevent. Following the fire, the organizations reevaluated their methods. The 
Triangle Fire forced the WTUL and ILGWU to change their original policies. I will examine the 
change in policy and how it continues influencing the course of American labor.  
The first part of my work is an analysis and explanation of the labor organizations that 
played a prominent role in the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike and consequently the Triangle Factory Fire. 
The American Federation of labor influenced the policies and ideologies used by the Women’s 
Trade Union League and International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union. A discussion of the 
labor groups’ relationship with the AFL is essential, because it creates an understanding of the 
policies they followed before the Triangle Fire.  
 After explaining the origins of the organizations, my work will move into a discussion of 
the 1909 Shritwaist Strike and the 1911 Triangle Factory Fire. After the picketing had ended and 
an agreement had been signed, leaders fully thought their policies, especially organizing women 
through striking, had validated themselves. The Triangle Fire proved to these organizations that 
the 1909 walkout was not as successful as they originally thought. When the fire occurred, the 
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grief-stricken people of New York City remembered how only a year earlier, victims joined the 
WTUL and ILGWU for better working conditions. 
 I will also discuss how WTUL and ILGWU organizers reacted to the tragedy. It was a 
shock to women labor organizers that their methods were not as influential as they thought. 
Analyzing the people, classes, ethnicities, etc. in the 1909 event reveals the cracks in the united 
front labor leaders sold to the public. Until the Triangle Fire occurred, leaders were satisfied with 
their guidelines for aiding rebellious workers. The 1909 Shirtwaist Strike was the ultimate test 
and the Triangle Fire showed the organizations that they needed to change their methods. 
The final part of my work looks at what course the WTUL and ILGWU chose to follow 
after the fire. In its aftermath, these organizations considered their pro-strike policies. When 
faced with the reality that their strategies were not working, the WTUL changed its focus to 
securing protective legislature for women. At the same time, the male-led ILGWU continued 
advocating for mass strikes while attempting to create a universally recognized protocol between 
union leaders and factory bosses. The Factory Investigating Commission was the most successful 
group created in response to the fire. It set the foundation for a new era of progressive reform in 
factories. Their findings led to the establishment of over twenty bills in New York specifically 
for factory workers in the state. By its dissolution in 1915, the commission had investigated 
thousands of factories across New York and published their findings for the federal government 






Chapter 1  
Organizational Beginnings 
The organization of working girls’ clubs, unions, and societies with a community of 
interests, despite the obstacles to such a movement, bears testimony to it, as to the 
devotion of the unselfish women who have made their poorer sister’s cause their own, 
and will yet wring from an unfair world the justice too long denied her.1 
 
Before delving into the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike and the tensions among the various women 
and organizations involved in the twentieth century labor movement, it is critical to understand 
how these groups began. Understanding the roots and original ideologies of the American 
Federation of Labor, the Women’s Trade Union League, and the International Ladies’ Garment 
Workers’ Union establishes a broader understanding of their roles in the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike 
and the tragedy at the Triangle Factory in 1911. A firm understanding of why these groups were 
founded and what their policies originally looked like illustrates how much the WTUL and 
ILGWU changed after the Triangle Fire. 
 The American Federation of Labor’s long history began in 1886. The group broke away 
from the Knights of Labor and offered another opportunity for unions to have an organization 
representing them. Most members who no longer agreed with the Knights of Labor wanted the 
ability to strike and disliked the isolation the Knights created. From its beginning, the Knights 
were covert about their operations and who was allowed a membership. Additionally, members 
clashed over Henry George’s idea of a single tax. In this situation, people could own land, 
natural resources, etc., but these resources belonged to everyone instead of the person who 
owned it. This early sign of socialism in America plus the tension caused over the secrecy of the 
group led to dissatisfaction among a faction of the Knight’s members. Forty-two delegates 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1. Jacob A. Riis and Museum of the City of New York, How the Other Half Lives; Studies 
among the Tenements of New York (New York: Dover, 1971), 189. 
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originally from the Knights wanted their own federation that focused on trade unionism.2 Samuel 
Gompers was elected president of the newly inaugurated American Federation of Labor. The 
policies women’s organizations later adopted were originally created by the AFL.  
These ideologies included the demand for higher wages, cleaner working environments, 
and few hours. Women labor organizers recognized the need for women to likewise petition for 
these concepts. Increased wages would help working-class, immigrant women and their families 
pull themselves up from poverty. An eight-hour work day would give workers more leisure time 
to rest, attend school, and take care of other familial duties such as laundry, etc. Emphasis was 
placed on higher wages and less hours, but clean environments were also essential. Consumption 
(tuberculosis) was rampant in factories and sweatshops where there was little air ventilation. In 
the early twentieth century, populists and socialists were gaining traction in America. The AFL 
had an opportunity to join forces with these creative groups in an effort to help the working poor 
in America. Historians including Selig Perlman and Louis Reed agree that Gompers and the AFL 
turned their backs on these social movements and instead followed their own trade union ideas.3  
 In his autobiography Seventy Years of Life and Labor, Samuel Gompers spent a chapter 
discussing his thoughts and involvement in the women’s labor movement. Gompers maintained 
that “for the labor movement, like all primary human movements, is neither male nor female- it 
is the instrumentality of unity.”4 Gompers explains he always thought women were fundamental 
to trade unions and because of this, he was a strong supporter of suffrage and equal rights for all. 
Gompers claimed he not only spoke up for women, but also helped them until women 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2. Arthur J. Goldberg, AFL-CIO: Labor United (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), 23. 
!
3. Stuart Bruce Kaufman, Samuel Gompers and the Origins of the American Federation of 
Labor, 1848-1896. Contributions in Economics and Economic History; No. 8. 1973, xii. 
 
4. Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1925), 479.  
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organizations were able to function on their own. He even mentioned the inner turmoil between 
working women and upper-class women as well as his dislike for the intertwining of socialism 
and labor. Despite Gompers’ assertions that he originally helped women organize, there is little 
evidence that it is true. Instead, the president of the American Federation of Labor stood back 
and let women work tirelessly on their own to achieve labor rights without offering the needed 
support. 5 
From its beginning, the AFL acknowledged the presence of women workers in the 
American labor force. Its membership pledge states “no discrimination shall be made on account 
of sex, creed, or colors.”6 In 1892, the group began publicly searching for women organizers as 
well as hinting at their support of women’s suffrage.7 The group called for suffrage and the 
establishment of women organizers at the convention, but never seriously championed women’s 
causes and only hired two women organizers between 1890 and 1908. Four hundred ninety-six 
delegates attended the 1903 convention, but only five were women. Appeasement was simple 
when the organization’s leaders refused equal representation to women Additionally, it was easy 
for ambitious affiliates to navigate around the issue of sex and race. As stated in their pledge, the 
AFL asserted that anyone could join the organization. The reality was that the organization and 
their affiliated unions preferred American born men who were skilled laborers. The local unions 
established membership fees that were too high for African Americans to pay, some specified 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5. Ibid, 481. 
 
6. Samuel Gompers, The Samuel Gompers Papers: A National Labor Movement Takes Shape, 
1895-98, vol. 4, ed. Peter J. Albert, Stuart B. Kauffman, Grace Palladino (Chicago, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1991). 
 
7. American Federation of Labor, Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-third Annual 




blacks were not welcome to their programs, and others claimed they lacked the require skills to 
join their group. The same discrimination was also used against immigrant men.  
Where unions with both sexes were present in the surrounding community, members told 
AFL officers that the women disliked labor organization. Local unions used the same reasons for 
not letting African Americans join against women. It was partially true that women showed less 
interest in organizing, but the reason men claimed this was because of the men’s personal beliefs 
about working women. Union men and their male leaders shared the misconstrued belief that 
working-woman held jobs so they could make extra money. This extra money was spent on non-
essential items such as hats, not to support a growing family. Men worked, because they had 
families to provide for. To them, women were taking away their jobs and forcing their wages 
down. After they grew tired of working, men assumed the young women would get married, 
have children, and expect their husbands to take care of their living expenses. The reality was 
that the majority of working women also had families to provide for. At AFL conventions in the 
1890s, efforts were made to secure working women legislation such as a fixed wage and working 
hours, but they never made it through Congress.8  
 By the early twentieth century, America had five million working women. The AFL only 
represented a small percent of workers in the United States. Six point eight percent and less than 
one percent of America’s men and women respectively benefited from the organization’s 
policies for wages, working conditions, etc.9 What accounts for this low percentage is that the 
AFL was made up of skilled, native-born Americans. The group had three reasons for not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8. Gladys Boone, The Women’s Trade Union Leagues in Great Britain and the United States of 
America (New York: Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, 
1942), 54. 
!
9. Leo Wolman, “The Extent of Labor Organization in the United States in 1910,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (30 May 1916), 499-500.  
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wanting to help America’s working women: “they were unskilled, they were immigrants, and 
they were female.”10 The elite group saw women as a threat to the job and wage security of 
skilled men. It was true that women accepted lower wages, which drove the average wage down 
for the entire working-class. Most women in the workforce were immigrants, which was an 
encroachment on the standards native workmen had established. Finally, the AFL followed the 
societal ideology that women belonged at home raising children rather than working in 
factories.11  
Women could be members of affiliate unions if they were skilled enough and the union 
allowed women to join, but the group would always view them as less skilled than their male 
counterparts. As with male immigrants, the AFL concluded that immigrant women workers were 
unskilled. Not only could they never be as skilled as native born workers, their inability to speak 
English was seen as a sign that foreign workers were not smart. Although the organization 
accepted women, it is clear that the conditions of women in labor was not one of the 
organization’s top priorities. 
 In an attempt to organize working-class women, a socialist named William English 
Walling created the Women’s Trade Union League of America in 1903.  Walling was originally 
inspired by the original WTUL in England. The goal of the organization was “to assist in the 
organization of women wage earners into Trade Unions.”12 Walling talked with members of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10. Nancy Schrom Dye, As Equals and Sisters: Feminism, the Labor Movement and the 
Women’s Trade Union League of New York (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981), 13. 
 
11. Ibid, 14. 
 
12. Boone, 250. 
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English original in 1902 and sought to help working women with the struggled they faced. He 
had seen their problems first-hand as a factory inspector.13  
With the help of Mary Kenny O’Sullivan, three meetings were held in November 1903 to 
form the Women’s Trade Union League. O’Sullivan first became involved in unions when she 
was a dressmaker. In 1892, she became a paid, female organizer for the bookbinding union, 
which was under AFL leadership. After the labor group took away her position and she married, 
O’Sullivan stopped union work. When deciding who should become involved in creating the 
WTUL, Walling instantly chose Mary Kenny O’Sullivan, because of her AFL knowledge. 14 Not 
only was the WTUL focused on women laborers as members, they also stipulated that allies 
could participate in helping women gain representation. By establishing a board made of women 
organizers, the new organization showed its desire to allow women to create policies for 
themselves.  
 Once the original meetings in Boston took place, a variety of well-known labor and 
progressive women were asked to serve as the WTUL’s first board members. The Boston 
socialite and reformer Mary Morton Kehew was chosen as the league’s first president. Mary 
Kenny O’Sullivan became secretary and Jane Adams of Hull House fame was selected as vice 
president. These board members eagerly left Boston to create local branches primarily in the 
Northeast.15 
 My work mainly focuses on members of the New York branch of the WTUL. One 
woman brought into the New York league by Walling was Leonora O’Reilly. O’Reilly started 
working in the garment industry at an early age and began her involvement in unions when her 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13. Ibid, 43. 
 
14. Dye, 14. 
 
15. Ibid, 17. 
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mother took her to Knights of Labor meetings. Before accepting Walling’s invitation, Leonora 
was a prominent member in Working Girls Clubs and unions such as the United Garment 
Workers.16 Walling wanted the WTUL to unite women of all classes in the common goal of 
building women run trade unions. O’Reilly came into the organization already understanding the 
importance of bringing all women of all backgrounds and social standings together. In early 
speeches as a member of the Working Women’s Society, O’Reilly spoke about her belief that all 
women are sisters. When William Walling sent a letter early in 1903 asking her about joining the 
new WTUL, Leonora wrote on the back, “Keep at it until we get the best Trade Unionists 
believing in us.17 These hopeful words show the optimism O’Reilly had when she first joined the 
group’s efforts to organize women. 
Mary Dreier was the less outgoing sister of Margaret Dreier Robins. Leonora O’Reilly 
recruited Margaret to become part of the New York league, and in 1905 she took on the role of 
national president. When she married her husband and moved to Chicago, her younger sister, 
Mary, took up the vacant New York leadership role. When Mary Dreier and her sister Margaret 
became involved in the labor movement and WTUL in 1904, they had no first-hand experience 
with labor or working-class women. The sisters wanted to spend their lives advocating for a 
worthy cause, and women’s labor struggles was where they settled. In 1908, the WTUL reported 
that the majority of their money came from donations. Over a third of these funds came from the 
Dreier sisters.18 Although Mary was originally not as confident as her older sister, she became a 
champion of working-class women and was essential to the running of the New York branch.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16. Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, A Generation of Women: Education in the Lives of Progressive 
Reformers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 91-2. 
 
17. William English Walling to Leonora O’Reilly, December 17, 1903. 
 
18. Women’s Trade Union League of New York, Annual Report 1907 – 1908. 
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Unlike Leonora O’Reilly, the Dreier sisters were new to the labor movement, but all three 
women enthusiastically joined the WTUL. Mary strongly agreed with her sister’s feelings on the 
importance of female unionization. A piece written by Margaret for Life and Labor in 1912 
reflects their early sentiments about unions:  
The Chief social gain of the Union Shop is not its generally better wages and shorter 
hours, but rather the incentive it offers for initiative and social leadership, the call it 
makes through common industrial relationship and the common hope upon the moral and 
reasoning faculties, and the sense of fellowship, independence and group strength it 
develops.19 
 
Margaret Dreier Robins’ words demonstrate the naïve sentiments the group’s leaders originally 
had about unity among working women and all social classes. The league wanted to educate 
working women so they could have the power to lead unions and organizations. The drastic 
change from relying on unity through striking to lobbying for protective legislation will be 
discussed in a later chapter. 
A final leading member of the New York league was Helen Marot. Marot was also not 
from a family where she was forced to work at a young age. Instead, she was known for her 
Philadelphia library that attracted both socialists and progressive reformers. She was an active 
social investigator and was a member of the Child Labor Association and Association of 
Neighborhood Workers. In 1906, she became the New York WTUL secretary. During her time 
as a member, Marot was vocal about her thoughts on labor strategies, policy, and how women 
might best be organized. Her peers respected her and her letters and speeches often influenced 
their own ideologies. Helen Marot’s 1914 book American Labor: From Conspiracy to Collective 
Bargaining discusses early twentieth century labor organizations and their policies and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19. Margaret Dreier Robins, “Self-Government in the Workshop: The Demand of the Women’s 
Trade Union League,” Life and Labor, vol. 2, April, 1912. 
!
! 17 
organizing methods. Throughout the book readers also catch glimpses of Marot’s opinions on 
unions, labor organizations, and problems with women workers.  
Marot was more outspoken than her colleagues. Members of the WTUL knew working 
women were discriminated against by labor organizations, union men, and the bosses that 
employed them. This is proven by statistics, interviews, and leader’s such as Leonora O’Reilly’s 
first-hand work experiences. The wide-spread discrimination made it difficult for women to 
organize. Marot, however, disagreed with these sentiments. As she states in her book:  
For several reasons the organization of women wage-earners is a subject apart from the 
organization of workers as a whole… Although there are unquestionably more men 
organized than women, there are also more men than women in the more organizable 
trades. The question of proportional membership of me and women is an open one. It is 
hypothetical to state that there is a policy of discrimination against the unionizing of 
women.20 
 
Marot’s opinion was uncommon among women, but it is an example of how some ladies sided 
with men over the issue of organizing women. WTUL leaders had proof that unions 
discriminated against women and wanted solutions to overcome this. Helen Marot disagreed and 
wanted emphasis placed on both sexes earning better working conditions, wages, etc. 
She goes on to comment, “discrimination against women as members of a union is 
negligible.”21 Marot was not afraid to speak her mind about her opinions on all aspects of the 
American labor movement in the early twentieth century. The prominent labor figure thought 
women should not have special groups dedicated to organizing them because they were no 
different than working-men. Marot continued as an active ally in the WTUL. A variety of strong 
women with varying ideologies made up the WTUL. The differences in opinion within the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20. Helen Marot, American Labor Unions: From Conspiracy to Collective Bargaining (New 
York: Arno, 1969), 65. 
 
21. Ibid, 67. 
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league created tensions throughout the 1909 to 1913 strike era and continued when the league 
changed from focusing on organized labor to legislation.  
The American Federation of Labor showed little interest in the WTUL’s organization 
efforts, but they made sure to pledge its allegiance to the AFL. The group was aware that some 
workers would view them as encroaching on the larger labor organization. This is why they 
decided to cooperate with the AFL without asking for an endorsement at their annual convention. 
The WTUL members at the first Boston meetings agreed that because of their status as all-
female newcomers they should achieve something historic or worthwhile before asking for a 
public endorsement. By first accomplishing something without AFL approval, the WTUL 
thought its first endorsement would be because they were essential to the labor movement. The 
decision to not seek endorsement was agreed upon even though the AFL already endorsed 
another women’s group called the Church Association for the Advancement of the Interests of 
Labor and the Women’s Label League. 22 Samuel Gompers welcomed WTUL leaders into his 
group and invited them to the national conventions, but members were never given permission to 
serve as convention delegates.23 
When creating and following policy, the WTUL always made sure it first discussed it 
with AFL members. This was so it would not seem as if they were creating dual unions, which 
Samuel Gompers accused the league of being in 1907. That year, a group of mostly female 
cigarette makers reached out to the WTUL about representing them. They made up a union 
independent of the AFL called the Progressive Rolled Cigarette Makers. The women could not 
afford the dues of the AFL recognized cigar and tobacco unions. When the WTUL asked the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22. Dye, 16. 
!
23. Joan Dash, We Shall Not Be Moved: The Women's Factory Strike of 1909 (New York: 
Scholastic, Inc., 1996), 45. 
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AFL if the organization could represent the women and help them charter a union, the AFL 
denied the request, because they thought the women were opposed to the AFL.24  
Although the AFL never offered significant aid to the WTUL and at times were hostile to 
its efforts, the women wanted to please the group they pledged their service to, and always tried 
to impress the AFL. In the early twentieth century, the AFL was an extremely successful labor 
organization in the center of the public’s attention. If the WTUL strove for that level of success, 
the group had no choice but to follow the standards already set by the AFL. The early years of 
the female-led organization were difficult, because of the organization's self-imposed rule of 
following the AFL. During the time before the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike, WTUL members thought 
that dedicated persistence would eventually bring them recognition and respect in the labor 
movement.   
The AFL mostly ignored the WTUL, but the group had logical reasoning for continuing 
the relationship. If the AFL accepted them as an upstanding trade union, the nation and its 
workers would soon regard them in the same light. Without AFL approval, they might have been 
seen as radical feminists who ruined the American labor system. Creating a national organization 
outside of the larger organization would have cost money, which they lacked. Women were paid 
less and could not afford the standard union dues men were expected to pay. If the WTUL fell 
outside the Federation’s umbrella, they would have quickly collapsed. The AFL was one of the 
largest and most successful labor organizations in the United States, and its success was what 
other unions and organizations tried to emulate. It saw no other way to organize, educate, and 
implement women in the labor force than through following the AFL’s methods.25  
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Rather than dutifully following the lead of AFL policies, the WTUL found ways to 
appease the group while encouraging women to demand what they needed at their jobs. Several 
men’s groups had benefits for their members. Some of these included strike benefits, paid sick-
leave, and in some cases health care. In an attempt to gain more members, the organization made 
new types of benefits. An example of this is their push for marriage benefits. Members were 
aware that the majority of women workers were young immigrants who had plans to marry and 
leave the factories. Money was put away by the union for a working-woman until the time she 
married. When the worker left for married life, she would receive her benefit and use it to start 
her new life.26 
WTUL leaders had to navigate the notions of marriage. Representatives for the WTUL 
spoke out about the importance of staying healthy before marriage and having children. 
Hazardous work places led to physical and mental exhaustion that could permanently change 
workers for life. The WTUL were realistic when it came to young girls when they explained 
“marriage did not liberate women from drudgery; it merely substituted one form of exploitation 
for another.”27 In the early twentieth century, women were expected to respect and listen to what 
their husbands told them. The same principles applied to their bosses, because disobeying rules 
would cost them their job. Women organizers wanted to persuade women that joining a union 
was the best way for them to escape exploitation while becoming a well-informed worker. 
Leaders also wanted their own location separate from male-led meetings. Their proposed 
male-free meeting place was not only for leaders, but also members of their organization and 
unions they represented. New York board members had seen the dirty and unsafe meeting halls 
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women currently met in. Therefore, they wanted to provide a safe space for all union-minded 
women to gather. Additionally, meetings were held at night and women felt unsafe travelling to 
unknown places alone. Having their own space where women could freely speak their ideas 
meant there would be no pressure or dissent from male colleagues. In 1909, the league purchased 
a townhouse on East Twenty-Second Street. It was located in the middle of New York City’s 
clothing district, which provided easy access for workers.28 
The WTUL recognized that men and women were not the same, but never strove for 
gender equality like today’s feminist movement. When the league first began organizing, it 
emphasized that class was more important than gender and ethnicity. Despite this sentiment, 
William English Walling and the group’s first officers listed women’s suffrage as one of the 
WTUL’s goals. Emphasis was on class, because several ladies such as Mary Drier were middle 
or upper-class unlike the lower-class women they represented. In their minds, all classes should 
be able to work together for the greater good no matter their sex or skill level. In 1913, an officer 
of a union the WTUL was working with said of the women’s group and its upper-class leaders, 
“leisure-class women [cannot] organize working women.”29 The speaker also said she hoped 
workers would realize they should organize themselves, without the help of the type of women 
who made up the WTUL. 
The league came in contact with mostly Jewish and Italian women, but never fully 
understood their diverse ethnicities. Many immigrant women followed the wishes of their 
husbands and fathers. They struggled to see themselves as part of the union movement and even 
if they could imagine it, most girls were forced to give all the money they earned to the male 
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head of the house. Upper-class women were not aware of the differences between class and 
ethnicity, because their privilege sheltered them. With their fine education and upbringing, these 
ladies had little experience with people who were not white or upper-class. This led to a blind 
ignorance on how to interact with lower-class people. They viewed working-class women as 
workers, not female workers, which distracted league members from the different experiences 
women had from men. One of the differences between men and women workers was that women 
often had to deal with the unwanted advances of their male employers. Fighting these situations 
often led to their pay being taken away or in a woman losing her job. WTUL leaders never fully 
realized that the women they organized faced two forms of work-place oppression: female and 
immigrant oppression.  
Along with recruiting immigrant workers, the WTUL was desperate to have American 
born members. On September 26, 1911, Mary Dreier wrote to her sister about the New York 
leagues’s desire for American working girls, “The girls are bitter toward the union and also to 
the Jews, whom they say have not treated them fairly. Yet the girls are good stuff- we are all 
pining to get ahold of the American girls.” 30 It was agreed within the organization that having a 
large number of American girls as members would show foreign women they should not fear 
unions, but American workers thought there was no place for them in female-led unions. They 
knew New York unions were made up of mostly Jewish and Italian immigrants. If they could not 
speak Italian or Yiddish, they were unable to follow the proceedings of union meetings. Similar 
to the thoughts of skilled, union men, female workers born in America thought of immigrant 
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workers as competition that drove wages down. American women wanted no part of unions and 
their organizations if it meant their needs were not put above those of foreign workers. 
It was not until 1910 that the WTUL understood its goals did not match the AFL’s 
regarding supporting unskilled, immigrant working women. In 1903, Chicago’s garment workers 
went on strike. Those striking were primarily female. The United Garment Workers, an affiliate 
of the AFL, led the protest with the Chicago branch of the league offering their support. Early 
the next year, an agreement confirming workers’ right to unionize was made with the biggest 
firms: Hart, Schaffner, and Marx. Once this agreement was complete, the UGW no longer 
wanted to support immigrant women still marching against smaller shops. The UGW ended the 
strike, which resulted in the continuation of open shops. It also meant thousands of female 
workers were blacklisted and no longer had a job.31  The AFL showed no leadership or control 
over their UGW affiliate. league leaders saw the lack of response and no reprimanding as an 
agreement with the UGW decision to stop the strike. The WTUL felt strongly about helping 
immigrant women no matter their skill set and the AFL knew this. The unwillingness of the AFL 
to recognize the league and support their mission angered members including Helen Marot and 
the Dreier sisters. 
The next event to further build on tension between the league and AFL was the 1912 
Lawrence, Massachusetts, textile strike. It was led by the Industrial Workers of the World. The 
IWW disliked the AFL and its policies. At the request of the AFL, the league branch in Boston, 
Massachusetts, agreed to not get involved. Soon after the event started, the WTUL realized it 
was another labor struggle that was a “magnificent uprising of oppressed, unskilled foreign 
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workers,” which was in line with who leaders wanted to support and organize.32 After asking the 
AFL’s United Textile Workers approval to help these women, the Boston branch began 
collecting funds and gave out necessities such as food and clothes to striking workers. The 
president of the UTW, John Golden, quickly got a small number of men to join the UTW and 
sign an agreement. Once this was done, the UTW stopped supporting the strike. The league 
wanted to continue supporting the workers still fighting, but the league left the demonstration, 
because the AFL was no longer involved.33  
Up until this time, the AFL had only sporadically given the WTUL financial aid. In 1912, 
one hundred and fifty dollars was donated each month. Money stopped as soon as the women 
went against the UTW in Lawrence.34 Once again, the AFL let one of their official affiliates act 
as it saw fit. League organizers could have acted on their own during the strike, but the UTW 
affiliation stopped them. Many members such as Sue Ainslie Clark thought that meekly 
following the UTW so their relationship with the AFL stayed intact showed how weak the 
female-led organization really was. 
Sue Ainslie Clark was the president of the Boston league. After the withdrawal from the 
Lawrence strike, Clark wrote her feelings on the matter in a letter to Margaret Dreier Robins in a 
letter in April 1912: 
To me, many of those in power in the American labor movement today seem to be 
selfish, reactionary, and remote from the struggle for bread and liberty of the unskilled 
workers. Are we, the Women’s Trade Union League, to ally ourselves with the ‘stand-
patters’ of the Labor Movement or are we to hold ourselves ready to aid the insurgents- 
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those who are freely fighting the fight of the exploited, the oppressed, and the weak 
among the workers?35   
 
Clark echoed the emerging sentiments of league members across the nation. Members had begun 
working for the organization, because they wanted to organize women workers while helping 
marginalized, immigrant women gain rights as American workers. Bowing down to the policies 
of the mostly male AFL went against league principles and its members finally saw the bigger 
organization’s limitations. 
 From 1913 on, the WTUL tried new ways of being independent while still remaining on 
good terms with the AFL. Members also contemplated having a separate federation for women. 
When it was decided a separate group would essentially create a second WTUL, the league still 
had no solution for navigating its ties. In 1921, the league thought of a fix to the issue, which 
they presented for approval. They requested the authority to create federal unions for the groups 
of women who could not join AFL affiliated groups. AFL leaders wanted no competition from 
other labor groups. The national league’s proposal was immediately rejected because of their fear 
of dueling unions.36 The league was continually disappointed by the AFL’s unwillingness to 
support unions for women, but they knew breaking from the organization might end in 
disbandment.  
In a letter Raymond Robins wrote to his sister-in-law, Mary Dreier, he explained why the 
league still could not free itself from the AFL, “The American Federation of Labor with all its 
shortcomings… is none the less the true representative body of organized labor in this country… 
as a matter of expediency you must cooperate with the policy of the American Federation of 
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Labor.”37 When it started in 1903, the WTUL followed the AFL, because it was the most 
successful labor organization and knew how to operate. A decade had passed since the league 
aligned itself with the AFL and it still could not disassociate with the group for the same reason. 
Once it was clear to all members of the league that being an independent organization for 
women was not feasible, they continued what they had been doing from the beginning. The 
WTUL renewed efforts to convince men to allow women into their trade unions, because they 
knew unions were dominated by males. In their eyes, the integration of both genders of skilled 
and unskilled workers would create an unstoppable force against factory bosses. 
Male workers in the garment making industry founded the International Ladies’ Garment 
Workers’ Union. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the garment industry began rapidly 
expanding. A large influx of mainly Italian immigrants began finding jobs in the growing 
business. The majority of men operated as cloak and suit makers while women manufactured 
shirtwaists and undergarments. The cloakmakers already organized decided it would be 
beneficial for all members of the industry if a union was made for the entire women’s garment 
industry. 38 
 The United Brotherhood of Cloak Makers’ released a statement in March 1900 calling 
on their fellow workers to answer the call for unionization: “The United Brotherhood… has 
come to the conclusion that in order to control our trade, to obtain higher wages and shorter 
hours, and to raise our members to a higher level, in short in order to improve our condition, we 
must have not only local unions, but also a well-organized national union for all America.”39 The 
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message by the Brotherhood inspired the ideology of the International Ladies’ Garment 
Workers’ Union, which formed three months later. Similar to the AFL and WTUL, the ILGWU 
thought organizing workers gave them the power to demand shorter hours, better wages, etc. The 
idea of a union for all of the United States was misleading. Its main concern was over immigrant 
men having union representation. The group extended an invitation to working women, but their 
first priority was working-men. 
 On June 3, 1900, other garment workers answered the call made by the United 
Brotherhood and the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union was created. Eleven 
delegates from seven garment unions were present. These unions had two representatives at the 
meeting: The Brotherhood of Cloak Makers, the Skirt Makers’ Union of Greater New York, the 
Cloak Makers’ Protective Union of Philadelphia, and the Cloak Pressers’ Union of Baltimore. 
The Cloak Makers’ Union of Baltimore, the Cloak Makers’ Union of Brownsville, and the Cloak 
Makers’ Union of Newark, New Jersey all sent one delegate.40  
Later that month, the AFL created an official charter, which the new union paid for.41 
From the beginning, the AFL supported the ILGWU, which was strikingly different from their 
reaction to the all-female league. There was not a struggle between the two male groups. It was 
easier for the AFL to recognize a union that was not led by women or geared toward organizing 
female workers. The ILGWU wanted to champion immigrant men and the AFL favored male 
workers who were born in America. If an organization was willing to represent immigrant men, 
the AFL would not stop them as long as they were affiliated. The AFL viewed the struggles of 
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immigrant men as a burden and the new union gave them a reason for not putting effort into 
helping them. 
There were two reasons the AFL quickly chose to work with the ILGWU. The first was 
that the AFL preferred working with skilled men, because the organization thought it was 
smarter and could therefore better manage a union.42 A second reason the AFL immediately 
supported the group was because it was virtually a giant union. The ILGWU’s board members 
served as the leaders over its local unions and the entire group fell under the AFL. Unions were 
not seen as a threat to the AFL. At times leaders opposed the WTUL, because it was a labor 
organization, not a union. The AFL was eager to accept union affiliates to further build its 
credibility as the champion of America’s working people. Throughout the early years of the 
ILGWU, the AFL gave significant funds to help it organize. The AFL gave four hundred dollars 
to the IGLWU in 1902 simply to advertise the existence of the new union.43 
The major difference between the AFL and its new affiliate was their political beliefs. 
One of the reasons the founding members of the AFL broke away from the Knights of Labor was 
because of member’s who supported socialism, which they saw as a threat to the Knights. The 
majority of the young organization’s leaders were Jewish and had a strong socialist ideology, 
because of their experiences in Europe and Czarist Russia. AFL policy was to keep politics and 
union work separate, but the ILGWU encouraged its members to become politically involved. 
Members moved to the United States, because they felt hopeless in the violent situations created 
by the government of their homeland. They rationalized that involvement in the United States’ 
democratic system of government would ensure the bloodshed from home would not follow 
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them. Despite their political differences, the AFL continued its support of the union as long as its 
socialist ideologies stayed in check.44 
The ILGWU could not exclude or show prejudice against women workers in its local 
unions, because women were the majority of workers in the women’s garment industry. 
Embracing socialists, immigrants, and women gave it an advantage over other similar 
organization such as the United Garment Workers of America who closely followed AFL 
policies. The WTUL had socialist leaders including Rose Schneiderman, but the majority of its 
leading ladies disapproved of the political group. The ILGWU showed little interest in helping 
its local unions organize beyond providing startup funds. Instead, it let the local unions organize 
and then keep themselves running. 
In the beginning, the WTUL was willing to help any union wanting to strike. The 
ILGWU supported its unions striking, but it was impossible for them to help, because the group 
often had no money. Since the ILGWU offered no aid, the league took on organizing lockouts, 
etc. while the ILGWU showed support without offering any significant help. The AFL did 
everything it could to persuade workers not to walkout, but would lend money and other backing 
if they chose to leave their jobs in protest.  
All three groups were willing to help at a moment’s notice in the early twentieth century. 
By 1909, WTUL and ILGWU funds were exhausted and they had grown tired of the amount of 
strikes occurring. In 1905 the WTUL dealt with a large laundry movement in Troy, New York, 
neckwear strikers in 1906, white-goods workers in 1907, and a variety of other strikes across the 
manufacturing industries. In 1907, the ILGWU was able to help the cloakmakers and children 
coatmakers in Boston and New York walkout.  
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A year after the WTUL was found; a member of the ILGWU sat as a representative on 
the league’s executive board.45 The depression that took place in 1908 almost ended the WTUL. 
The league’s membership went from almost three hundred members to only having officers as its 
makeup. Early into the next year, the women organizers created a tentative affiliation with the 
ILGWU in order to keep building their membership following the depression.46 The ILGWU’s 
first major contact with the women-led group happened during 1909 Shirtwaist Strike. When the 
general strike officially began, the league offered assistance to Local 25, the New York Ladies’ 
Waist Makers’ Union, which took on leadership responsibilities. The organization helped 
organize picket duty, take union dues, and collect donations. They worked well together during 
the protest, but their relations deteriorated afterwards. Leaders became angry over the men who 
ran the ILGWU and Local 25. They said an all-male union was detrimental to the inclusion of 
females in the labor movement. Besides neglecting their female members, league women also 
insisted the national organization and Local 25 were not being run correctly. This 
mismanagement also stemmed from what the WTUL saw as a lack of interest in working-class 
women. In the late 1910s and into the 1920s, the WTUL continued to hold itself above the 
ILGWU. The organizations still recognized each other, but their days of cooperation were over. 
When discussing the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union in this work, I will 
mainly focus on Local 25 in New York City. Not much is known about its local unions, because 
no known records exist.47 Local 25 was created in 1905 and was not a famous name until the 
1909 Shirtwaist Strike. Before the strike, Local 25 reported at conventions that it needed money 
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in order to continue operating. Although it is reported that the union had only one hundred 
members and four dollars to function, Local 25 supported garment workers when the Triangle 
lockout began on September 27, 1909.48 Once the general strike was called on November 22, 
1909, Local 25 became the centerpiece of union recruitment and deal making among shop 
workers and their owners, because they represented the city’s garment industry. Local 25 was not 
prepared for the overload of workers signing up for the union and picket duty. Similar to 
problems in the league, the ILGWU and its local unions struggled to find peace in a society 
where different races, classes, and political stances frequently clashed. The union ignored these 
issues and stuck with the labor strategies they had faith in. With its Jewish leadership, it worked 
throughout the twentieth century to secure better working conditions for its diverse immigrant 
membership. 
The explanations of the founding of these three groups and their policies towards women 
shows how they are all connected in the larger scheme of twentieth century American labor. The 
chartering of the WTUL and ILGWU with consent from the American Federation of Labor 
formed a strange hierarchy. The AFL was at the top of the chain, and the younger groups 
followed their lead, because they feared being blacklisted by the labor community. In the eyes of 
the league, the ILGWU was beneath them, because men led the union and were lax with the 
management of their local groups.49 The aloof feelings among all three groups meant 
opportunities for collaboration never occurred. Instead, they all attempted to reform America’s 
labor system while operating on their own.  
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Changes in the attitude of working women were slowly taking place, but both groups felt 
ready to lead a mass organizational effort. As the early 1900s progressed, more stories and 
investigations were being conducted on tenement and factory life. It was only a matter of time 
before the manipulative system broke. Once faced with a large situation of labor unrest, the 
organizations would have to prove that women could and should unionize for the betterment of 
their health and safety at work. However, the ultimate challenge for the WTUL and the ILGWU 




















Part 1 – The Uprising of Twenty Thousand 
Hail the waistmakers of nineteen nine, 
Making their stand on the picket line, 
Breaking the power of those who reign, 
Pointing the way, smashing the chain.50 
 
The women who held leadership roles in the Women’s Trade Union League had different 
personal reasons for organizing women. Some of these leaders though organizing women, 
specifically immigrant women, would help them overcome the harsh working and living 
conditions poverty had forced them into. Others such a Leonora O’Reilly wanted to bring 
working women together to educate them and introduce them to the culture middle and upper-
class women possessed. Even Helen Marot had her own emphasis, which was entirely on labor 
without politics, gender, etc. One component women involved with the WTUL all agreed on was 
the desire to unite women of all backgrounds across class lines. In the special strike edition of the 
New York Call published on December 29, 1909, the socialist newspaper reflected the push for 
unity among all women: “Now is the time for women in New York, Philadelphia, and in fact 
everywhere American shirtwaists are worn, to rise in their might and demonstrate that with 
them… they have said goodbye to the products of the sweatshop… Friends, let us stop talking 
about sisterhood, and MAKE SISTERHOOD A FACT!”51 The 1909 strike was an opportune 
moment for the league members to make their wish for unity a reality, but the path to uniting 
women was not as easy as organizers imagined. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, there was unrest in the labor sector before the 
general strike was called in November 1909, but a combination of factors led to a boiling point. 
Workers suffered from low wages, poor working conditions, and crammed tenements. It is key to 
understand how working girls and the upper-class women who helped them lived, because it 
illustrates how different their upbringings and grasp of the world was. While working girls lived 
in East Side tenements, the elites of the upper classes and well-educated college girls from places 
like Bryn Mawr lived in town houses and luxury apartments.  
Several upper-class women wanted to secure a better living wage, working hours, etc. for 
young immigrants. Many of their reasons for helping were misguided. Some women felt it was 
their duty to support society in whatever way they could, because their elite lives were 
insignificant if their status was not used for good. The Dreier sisters became involved in the 
labor movement for this reason. Adamant suffragists saw working women as an opportunity to 
persuade more women to join their cause. In the end, their personal agendas overshadowed the 
needs of the people who had to live below the standard of living while toiling away in factories. 
Labor leaders in he WTUL were aware of the unrest between classes and political ideologies 
throughout the strike, but chose to maintain a united facade for the public rather than mend the 
mistrustful feelings broiling among participants. Both groups desired for everyone involved to 
cooperate and avoided making any group feel unappreciated. League leaders took a gamble when 
they actively chose to ignore the problems damaging their united front. 
The Uprising of Twenty Thousand was the largest labor event the WTUL was involved 
in. It was time for the league to show its full-support and prove that working women could 
successfully organize. They would also attempt to convince male laborers and the general public 
that an all-female organization could lead women workers. The Uprising of Twenty Thousand 
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was the biggest test for the WTUL’s and International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union’s 
original policies.  
The living conditions of immigrants across the country in the early twentieth century are 
well recorded by Progressives such as photojournalist Jacob Riis. New York City is the best 
documented, because the majority of immigrants entering the country took up residence there. 
The knowledge within these records illustrates the higher-quality conditions workers fought for 
when they went on strike. They told their stories while speaking about the standard of living they 
thought all humans deserve. 
 In New York City in 1900, three out of four families were impoverished and had an 
average income of five hundred and fifty dollars a year. At this time, it was estimated that 
families with four members needed at least six hundred and fifty dollars for living necessities 
including housing costs such as rent. Most families in New York City had more than four 
members. On top of their poverty, workers had to worry about the dangerous conditions they 
worked in. Over fifty thousand American workers died at their jobs in 1911.52  
These people lived in the worst buildings New York City had to offer. Even with as many 
as seven people to a room, families would take on renters for extra income. With low pay, life 
was an endless cycle of work. Lower-class people worked to get paid so they could feed their 
family and pay rent. Buying new clothes or getting medicine for an ill family member was 
almost impossible, because the cost meant less money for food and rent. Tenements averaged 
seven to eight stories tall. Toilets were usually outside and cold water came from an outdoor 
spigot or faucet inside. Buildings were infested with cockroaches, vermin, and lacked windows 
and circulating air, which moved people to sleep on fire escapes and stoops. Lawrence Veiller 
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called the East Side “The City of Living Death,” because the blocked fire escapes and cramped 
living quarters became firetraps.53  
Abysmal living conditions were not only a problem at home. Workers spent their days at 
factories and sweatshops that avoided city building codes. Before the Triangle Fire, there was no 
law in New York that required factories to run fire drills.54 Officials had already been discussing 
the lack of drills before 1911. Without them, it was thought workers would panic, because there 
was no procedure to follow. In the summer of 1910, the New York Board of Sanitary Control 
examined over one thousand shops and factories in the city. They reported ninety-nine percent of 
the shops inspected failed to meet mandatory safety standards. Many had faulty fire escapes, 
only one exit, locked doors, and doors that opened in instead of outward.55  
 The busy season for shops began in the spring and ended in the summer. During the peak 
period of garment making, some workers spent one hundred hours a week at their shop sewing 
from morning until the sun had long set. Most workplaces were poorly lit with gas lamps, which 
caused serious strain on the eyes. As many machines as possible were put into small spaces. 
People had little room to themselves during the work day. Employees sewed as many pieces as 
fast as they could in order to earn as much money as possible during the week. Contractors and 
floor managers urged them to sew more pieces while continually cutting piece rates without 
informing workers until they received their paycheck. Sewing machine operators spent so many 
hours operating their machines that it was common to develop permanent back injuries such as 
stooping. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53. Dash, 21 
 
54. Leon Stein, Michael Hirsch, and William Greider, The Triangle Fire (Centennial ed. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2010), 25. 
!
55. Ibid, 26. 
 
! 37 
Rose Cohen was a Russian immigrant who came to the United States when she was 
twelve-years-old. She wrote about her experience as an immigrant in New York City in her book 
Out of the Shadow. At her first factory job, Rose’s boss would make her stay late and take extra 
clothing home to work on. Soon after she started, Rose told her father, “The boss is hurrying the 
life out of me.”56 Many immigrants were in the same position, but they all continued to work. 
Rose had to support her father and provide money to help the rest of her family leave Russia. She 
spent the rest of her life working while spending time in and out of hospitals, because of her poor 
health, which started after she began factory work. 
Most shops lacked proper ventilation. Workers who turned fabric into full garments 
risked inhaling the fine particles from the cloth, which floated in the air of the room. Constant 
inhalation of the dust caused tuberculosis, which killed many workers each year. If a laborer was 
lucky enough to not be permanently damaged from illness, injury, etc., then their mental state 
was surely affected. A researcher named Annie MacLean wrote about seeing the nerves in young 
workers eyes and physical appearance in her work Wage-Earning Women by noting, “It appears 
in heavy eyes with deep dark rings, in wrinkled skin, and old young faces. The high rate of speed 
that must be maintained through so many successive hours is undermining the health of 
thousands of girls in this industry.”57 Tirelessly sewing each day with little pay and not a day to 
themselves quickly exhausted the mind and body. Eventually, many broke from the stress of 
their living conditions. Families could not afford losing income from a valuable factory job. 
Countless workers continued their jobs through their physical and mental pain. 
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 Sue Ainslie Clark and Edith Wyatt of the National Consumers’ League oversaw 
extensive research on how working women in New York lived. Clark and Wyatt’s in depth 
research reflected the Progressive Era popularity of investigative journalism to bring societal 
issues to public attention.  Their findings were presented in the book Making Both Ends Meet: 
The Income and Outlay of New York Working Girls, which was published in 1911. Some of their 
work was also published in McClure’s Magazine. McClure’s was a monthly periodical, which 
began the trend of muckraking with its political content. The opening statement of the article in 
the October 1910 issue of McClure’s clearly explains the contents of the authors’ investigation: 
These articles are based upon information obtained through an investigation conducted 
by the National Consumers’ League, and covering the earnings of working-girls-wages, 
overtime work, loss from slack seasons, their expenditure for shelter, food, clothing, etc., 
down to the last penny of their earnings, and their uncertain struggle to preserve health 
and vitality.58  
 
In order to accurately collect information for each female interviewed, the Consumers’ League 
asked questions over the type and amount of work done and how they used their payment to 
survive American life.59 What sets the work of Clark and Wyatt apart from other work at the 
time is their willingness to interview women from all job sectors. Girls interviewed related that 
money was saved where it could be. Sometimes this meant walking an hour to work instead of 
paying for transportation or renting out already cramped living spaces to strangers for extra 
income. 
An example of the common lifestyle of young garment workers is illustrated by a 
shirtwaist worker named Rachael. Rachael was a Jewish immigrant from Russia whose family 
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fled violence from Christians. The eighteen-year-old began factory work at five dollars a week 
and eventually moved to eleven. She talked about how bosses would cut worker pay if they 
thought they earned too much. Along with this, she spoke to interviewers about the long work 
hours and how bosses pressured them to constantly work as fast as they could.60  
 Outside of her job, Rachael lived with a sister in a small tenement with other girls. She 
also made her own clothing, washed her own laundry, and attended a night school where she 
most likely learned how to speak English. Rachael only had six days of work four months of the 
year. The rest of the year was spent with little to no work depending on what orders factories 
received. 
When Rachael became ill and missed work, she received no income and had to spend money on 
doctors and medicine. 
Her income for the year had been $348.25. Her expenses had been as follows: rent for 
one-third of room at $3.50 a month equaling $42 a year, suppers with landlady at 20 cents 
each equaling $63 a year, other meals approximately $90 a year, board while ill for seven 
weeks at $7 equaling $49 a year, doctor and medicine (about) $15, clothing $51.85, club, 
5 cents a week at $2.60 [for a year].61  
 
The total of her expenses was $313.45, which left Rachael with $34.80. 
  
The treatment women workers received from their superiors at low-wage jobs was 
discouraging. Threats from bosses about losing their jobs frightened women into not risking 
joining an organized group. Women were not taken seriously as workers and men thought they 
only worked for a little spending money. This notion completely ignored the reality that 
immigrant women had families to support. They could barely afford food and rent, yet were 
vilified for any joy they may have gotten from spending money on themselves. A work surveyor 
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noted the reality of young working girl’s situation when she wrote, “In New York City there is 
always a surplus of girls seeking labor; they are daughters of the poorer classes, and live in 
tenement houses, in close quarters- are shabbily clad, and their wages go to support perhaps a 
drunken father, or a widowed mother and fatherless children.”62 The reality of the situation of 
immigrant and native-born girls in the United States was that they desperate sought any menial 
way to make an income for their struggling families. 
Women struggled with unequal workloads in shops where men were unionized. The 
unorganized women had to pick up the slack from the unionized men. While union men enjoyed 
shorter hours, longer lunches, and better wages, women worked non-stop during the day and 
after the men had left for the evening while receiving less pay.63 With no representation, women 
workers had no choice but to do what their boss said or lose their job. 
A combination of events led up to the historic night in New York City at Cooper Union 
in November 1909. Earlier in the summer, a strike involving men and women began at Rosen 
Brothers and Leiserson’s due to the maltreatment they received as workers. Picketers made signs 
that said ‘We are striking for human treatment’ to show their bosses, the public, and other 
factories why they walked out.   
Clara Lemlich became the champion of the first workers who walked out. Lemlich was 
an immigrant originally from the Ukraine who was born at the end of the nineteenth century. In 
1903, Clara and her family came to the United States where she immediately began working. 
Three years later, the young woman helped form Local 25 of the ILGWU in New York City. 
When the men of Leiserson decided to walkout in September 1909, Clara convinced them to let 
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the women participate. From the start of her career as a labor activist, Clara spoke to crowds on 
street corners about the cause and decried alliances with upper-class women.  She soon became a 
heroic icon to laborers living in the East Side and was fondly spoken of in the socialist ran paper 
the New York Call.  
Unlike the Dreier sisters and Helen Marot who ran the New York WTUL, Clara had 
years of first hand-experience inside factories as a worker. After retiring from participating in the 
labor movement, Clara wrote to the American political activist Morris Schappes about her 
experiences, “I went to work two weeks after landing in this country. We worked from sunrise to 
sunset… The shop we worked in had no central heating, no electric power… The hissing of the 
machines, the yelling of the foreman, made life unbearable.”64 Clara’s account is another 
example of the common conditions immigrants worked in. 
Curious workers at the Triangle Factory heard about a meeting to organize workers at 
Clinton Hall in September 1909 and decided to attend. Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, the factory 
owners, became aware and let the whole factory know that unionization would not be tolerated. 
The Triangle Company had their own union called the Triangle Employees Benevolent 
Association, which employees were encouraged to join. An in-house union was a way for bosses 
to appease workers while continuing to operate their establishment as they saw fit. The factory 
organization was a way to fool workers into thinking they had representation while distracting 
them from actual unions. After the announcement, workers went to another union meeting. When 
the workers arrived the next morning, September 27, 1909, the factory was locked and 
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advertisements had already been posted to hire new employees. Rather than find new work, the 
fired Triangle workers joined other garment workers on the picket lines.65  
Women suffered at the hands of thugs and corrupt cops on the picket lines throughout the 
summer and fall of 1909. Cops would stand by as picketers were beaten and took the girls to jail 
for loitering, not picketing peacefully, or even for talking to strikebreakers entering and leaving 
factories. Factory bosses also bribed cops to protect their workers and intimidate picketers. At 
first, picketers thought the police were there to protect them. They soon learned not to trust New 
York City’s law enforcement. 
Rough cops took strikers to jail for doing nothing wrong. Picketers followed the union’s 
picket line rules: keep walking while talking to a strikebreaker, stay in small groups, and do not 
shout at or touch anyone, yet they still found themselves in the dark cells of the city prison. 
Picketers had instructions to take down police badge numbers if they were wrongfully arrested, 
but nothing came out of the practice.66  
A prime example of the difference between how working women and high-class ladies 
were treated occurred on the picket lines before the general strike was called. Mary Dreier, the 
president of the New York WTUL, was arrested for threatening to assault a worker after an 
interaction with a strikebreaker at the Triangle Factory. The story of her arrest and its aftermath 
appeared in the November 5, 1909, edition the New York Call: 
Mary Dreier… was covered with insults and arrested without cause yesterday while 
doing picket duty in the strike of the Ladies’ Waistmakers against the Triangle Waist 
Company…A member of the Triangle firm heard her speak to one of the girls as she 
came from work and in the presence of an officer he turned on Miss Dreier and shouted: 
“You are a liar. You are a dirty liar.” Miss Dreier turned to the officer and said, “You 
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heard the language that man addressed to me. Am I not entitled to your protection.” The 
officer replied, “How do I know you are not a dirty liar?”67 
 
As soon a Mary arrived at the police station and it was discovered who she was, she was 
immediately released. Survey magazine wrote, “…the police attitude toward the woman was 
deliciously revealed when the officer in charge upbraided her for not having told him she was 
‘the working girls’ rich friend,’ had he known…he would not have arrested her.”68 New York 
City police viewed upper-class women as respectable members of society. They feared a scandal 
might occur over their treatment of a high-class woman. Working girls were treated as inferior 
people, because of their workplace rebellion and status as poor immigrants. Furthermore, the 
money police received from Tammany Hall and factory bosses ensured protesters had a hard 
time picketing. 
They were routinely taken to court where judges imposed fines without giving the girls a 
fair trial. One magistrate named Olmstead told a group of girls who appeared in court before 
him, “You are on strike against God and nature, whose prime law is that man shall earn his bread 
by the sweat of his brow.”69  The strict judge thought it was fundamentally wrong for workers to 
defy their bosses. Olmstead had never worked in a factory, but he prescribed to the idea that 
people should follow the chain of command without question. Rebelling meant picketers broke 
society’s hierarchical order, and privileged bosses disliked being challenged. 
Before they knew better, striking girls thought judges would listen to them and empathize 
with their cause. Harsh words from magistrates such as Olmstead confused strikers. If the law 
was not on their side, who was? Unions like the ILGWU and supportive organizations such as 
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the WTUL were the only option they had for protection and support. It was the unions who paid 
the girls’ jail fines and cared for them after suffering through the workhouse on Blackwell Island. 
The two groups viewed women workers as their sisters and helped them up when the corrupt 
justice system took them down. 
Even with increasing incidents of beatings and jail time, the general strike was not called 
until November 22, 1909, at a meeting held at Cooper Union where speakers including Samuel 
Gompers and Mary Dreier addressed a restless crowd of disgruntled garment workers. The 
speakers continued to call for peace. They knew the hardships strikes caused workers who 
already struggled to make a living. Winter would bring even harsher conditions for picketers. 
Without an income and little financial support from the union, out of work protesters would have 
a difficult time paying for food, clothing, and shelter during the winter months. 
Clara Lemlich finally had enough of leaders not on the factory front lines preaching 
appeasement to the audience. The Jewish immigrant stood on the stage in front of Cooper Union, 
and asked who would support a general strike. Lemlich’s motion was quickly seconded and the 
crowd became so loud it took several minutes to quiet them. When she was older, Clara spoke 
about what led her to take the stage, “Each [speaker] talked about the terrible conditions of the 
workers in the shops. But no one gave or made any practical or valid solution.”70 While labor 
leaders wanted to take an easy road towards settlement, Clara Lemlich spoke on behalf of her 
fellow working-class brothers and sisters about bringing the fight straight to their bosses. The 
following afternoon, at least twenty thousand women left their sewing machines and took to the 
street in a citywide walkout. Union halls flooded with people as garment workers eagerly joined 
Local 25 of the ILGWU. 
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The goals of the workers who walked out were strikingly similar to the goals of the 
WTUL and ILGWU. Strikers wanted a fifty-two-hour work week, a standard for wages and 
piece rates, no subcontracting, and the stoppage of fines. Most importantly, the workers 
demanded union recognition as well as a closed shop policy.71 In the politics of labor, a closed 
shop means a business where only workers belonging to a union are hired. An open shop, 
therefore, is a shop where employees affiliated or not affiliated with a union are hired. The 
problem with open shops during the early twentieth century was that employers gave preference 
to non-union members when hiring, which created a blacklist for unionized workers. It was also 
a way for employers to deal individually with their workers instead of as a whole body under the 
protection of a union. They wanted an end to open shops even if it meant alienating their non-
union co-workers. Union members viewed closed shops as a giant step in the right direction for 
ensuring immigrant workers in the United States received treatment equal to native-born 
Americans. 
Labor organizations had already been dealing with workers of different ethnicities and 
their reasons for not wanting to organize. With the start of the 1909 general strike, the WTUL 
and its partner, Local 25 of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, were met with a 
willingness from Jews, Russian, and even native-born American workers to join the garment 
strike. Organizations and their inner operations are more complicated than workers uniting for a 
common cause. There is a hierarchy from leaders and organizers to the members and picketers, 
and these sections soon clashed over their differences. 
 The stories of impoverished immigrant workers striking in New York City emotionally 
moved upper-class women. League organizers put effort into speaking to society women, college 
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girls, and even suffragists in an attempt to educate the public on why workers needed better 
factory conditions. The addition of these and other upper-class women put a strain on the WTUL 
executive board and membership in general, because many of the women focused on their 
personal beliefs/goals instead of the aims of the strike. Most donations came from these upper-
class and educated ladies. The majority of the fund went to bailing strikers out of jail and paying 
their jail fines. Small stipends were offered to out of work strikers: three dollars for workers with 
dependents and a dollar fifty for other living situations were given each week. Most workers 
chose not to take the money, but with nearly twenty thousand people out of a job, the money 
used quickly added up. The financial aid given by society women helped keep the fund alive.72  
While workers and college girls walked the picket lines no matter the weather conditions, 
the WTUL executive board allowed more women on the board who had never seen the inside of 
a factory or sweatshop. J.P. Morgan’s daughter, Anne, was elected to the board with an 
endorsement by Mary Dreier. Anne’s father was an extremely wealthy American banker. Anne 
benefited from her father’s money and became a philanthropist. Once she showed sympathy for 
the working girls’ cause, Anne was put on the New York league’s board, because Mary knew 
Anne’s wealth was important for funding the strike. 
 Alva Belmont also became a board member during this time. Through her marriages to 
William Vanderbilt and O.H.P. Belmont, Alva Belmont became a socialite with millions of 
dollars behind her name. After the death of her second husband, she remade herself into a 
suffragist. She created the Political Equality Association, which followed the militant footsteps 
of England’s Emmeline Pankhurst and the Women’s Social and Political Union. The female 
dominated strike was an easy way for her to spread the word about votes for women as well as 
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persuade workers to join the suffragist cause. She organized a rally at the New York Hippodrome 
on December 6, 1909, for labor leaders as well as suffragists to speak at. The rich members of 
society sat in boxes while strikers had general audience seats. Banners hung around the 
Hippodrome demanding votes for women. After listening to what many outsiders considered 
radical speakers, the New York Times gave its input on Alva Belmont’s presence among the 
young striking girls. The newspaper reported, “Socialism, unionism, woman suffrage and what 
seemed to be something like anarchism were poured into the ears of fully eight thousand persons 
by Alva Belmont.”73 She was not a socialist, but the public viewed Alva Belmont as a radical, 
because she was a feminist and advocated for women’s suffrage. 
Alva Belmont ignored the criticism. Instead, she continued speaking about her personal 
belief in suffrage. On December 19, Alva Belmont went to Jefferson Market Courthouse where 
strikers taken to jail received a short trial before being fined or sent to the workhouse. The 
socialite stayed all night bailing girls out with her own money. When she ran out of the money 
she brought with her, she used her house as collateral. Even after witnessing how the girls were 
treated for defending their labor rights, Alva Belmont still focused solely on women’s suffrage. 
The New York Times quoted her as saying, “During those six hours I spent in that police court I 
saw enough to convince me and all who were with me beyond the smallest doubt of the absolute 
necessity of woman suffrage.”74 Her persistent stance on women’s suffrage demonstrates how 
some upper-class women involved constantly put their personal beliefs above the workers and 
the true purpose of the strike.  
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 From its beginning, the league promoted the unification of all social classes. Working 
women and members of the WTUL shared the injustices men put on their sex. The common 
oppressive experiences among these groups led WTUL organizers to thought uniting all women 
would solve their suffering.75 For this reason, some members agreed with the involvement of 
upper-class women. It was argued that their participation helped break down class barriers and 
bring together all women. Another factor was that these women donated twenty thousand dollars 
in aid. When the mass movement started, Local 25 only had four dollars to its name. It was hard 
for strikers to donate their own money, because they no longer had a stable income to support 
themselves. These rich women financed the strike, which made their inclusion on executive 
boards necessary. The presence of society women also kept the walkout relevant in public 
interest, because society columns in newspapers happily reported the involvement of women 
such as Alva Belmont in bailing picketers out of night court.76 Most of the ladies were born or 
married rich and had never needed to work for a living. Their interactions were with other white, 
rich Americans, which made them “naive about class and ethnic differences.”77  
There was still backlash from strikers and prominent labor leaders. The reliance of Local 
25 and the WTUL on elite women donating money put a burden on regular members who the 
strike was supposed to benefit. They no longer thought they could openly speak their mind about 
the struggles they faced, because they did not want to offend the ladies who now had power over 
union decisions. Additionally, they felt they had to agree with their opinions and ideas for 
fundraising, etc. Like the executive leaders, workers feared the women would stop donating 
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money if someone spoke against them. While the wealthy women earned praised in newspapers, 
the picketers who went through beating, fines, and sentences to the workhouse were ignored, 
which rightfully angered them.78  
Leaders actively chose not to speak about the tensions with upper-class allies at meetings, 
etc. The girls on the streets served as the face and resistance of the movement, but they were 
never invited into spaces where their feelings and ideas could be heard. Young girls in the strike 
thought they were being treated like naive children even though they suffered at the hands of the 
sweatshop and factory system. In order to gain donations, the New York league had factory girls 
meet for luncheons with society ladies where they spoke about their lives at home and at work. 
The girls related that they felt like they were paraded around for the ladies, which made them 
feel inferior. Instead of proactively supporting the strike, the society ladies ogled workers while 
participating from the comfort of their own homes. 
An example of these luncheons occurred on December 9, 1909. Ten girls presented to the 
Colony Club told their stories to women of the richest families in New York. More than one 
thousand dollars was given to the fund. Many of the girls present felt like animals forced to 
perform for money. They also thought the rich who donated could afford to give more money. 79  
Wealthy ladies never went to picket lines or factories where workers struggled for money to 
make a living. The elite may have been empathetic to the girls, but many wanted them to do 
more than be entertained by impoverished strikers. The WTUL and Local 25 continued bringing 
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 The difference between classes was especially apparent when it came to politics. Some of 
the WTUL leaders were socialists. Most factory workers in 1909 were also socialists, because 
the majority was Russian Jews who had escaped pogroms in their home country. Society women 
viewed socialists as radical and only joined the strike, because they wanted to push their political 
agenda over the good of women’s suffrage.80 When workers found out about the judgment they 
received for being part of the socialist movement, they refused to remain silent.  
Theresa Malkiel was striker who refused to bow down to society ladies and labor leaders. 
She understood the nuances of the walkout and put her thoughts into writing. Using a fictional 
character, Malkiel wrote about her experiences in her book Diary of a Shirtwaist Striker. When it 
was first published, her work was viewed as propaganda rather than Theresa speaking for those 
who could not.  The short book explores the warring ideologies between strikers and their 
supporters. Rich activists who viewed them as children wanted to give aid, because of their 
young age and status as lower-class immigrants. In the mind of the upper-class, helping the poor 
was a good deed for society. On the other side of the issue, strikers saw their unfair treatment as 
a reaction to their class and nationality. Malkiel wrote, because she wanted wealthy people to 
respect working girls the same way they respected rich men. She advocated for girls to speak up 
for themselves writing, “The sooner we demand justice as our right and not as a boon from the 
rich the better for us.”81 Malkiel was outraged by the treatment factory girls received from their 
wealthy allies. If more girls boldly took a stand, they might stop relying on others for help and 
instead independently represent themselves. 
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The law was also not on the side of socialist strikers, because they were not upper class 
businessmen and corrupt cops took bribes from business owners. Socialists had a reputation as 
anarchists and the New York City police force agreed. If a picketer was not ever beaten or taken 
to jail, she certainly saw it happen to a friend or coworker. Police had the job of protecting 
people, not harassing them for peacefully protesting. Based on the violence she saw, Malkiel 
wrote, “Talk about [socialists] being anarchists- I really wonder if that name doesn’t suit the 
police better than it does us girls?”82 Socialism was important to immigrant workers and they 
would not give their political stance up because supporters disapproved. It was part of their 
individual identities. The workers in the strike wanted to be treated as humans rather than 
faceless factory workers. They wished to afford a comfortable living without working 
themselves to death. 
 The women’s labor movement was complex and had different factions working against 
each other, but Malkiel was able to see through it all to the root of the problem: 
Here are thousands of young girls who have come to this country strong and full of desire 
to do things, but after slaving for a few years in the land of the free they have neither 
health nor money; they’ve become poorer and [America] richer. It stands to reason that 
our generous country is robbing them instead of being robbed.83 
 
WTUL and Local 25 leaders silently let tensions rise among picketers and upper-class 
sympathizers, but Theresa Malkiel took a firm stand against their exploitation. The socialist 
spoke on behalf of her working sisters who felt ridiculed by New York City’s elite. 
Alva Belmont was one of the millionaire women who looked down on socialism. At one 
point in the winter of 1909, a group of socialist picketers went to her home to speak with her. 
They wanted to understand her reasons for becoming involved in their struggle. She chose not to 
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speak with them, so they gave her secretary questions they had. Their questions were: “Are you 
interested in strikers because they are possible suffragists or because they are workers in 
trouble?” and “Do you believe the interests of the employers and workers are identical or could 
ever be identical?”84 Strikers were viewed as naïve girls, but they knew about their supporters 
ulterior motives. Alva Belmont refused to answer their questions and declined setting up a future 
meeting. She understood what many other ladies involved did not. Young, immigrant girls were 
not ignorant. They continued learning while fighting for the rights they thought workers 
deserved.85  
 Although Alva Belmont continued supporting the strike with the presence of socialists, 
some elite women were so scandalized when they discovered their involvement that they 
withdrew from their position in the WTUL. On January 2, 1910, a rally was held at Carnegie 
Hall to bring attention to the girls that had been arrested while picketing. Speakers included 
Leonora O’Reilly, from the WTUL, and Morris Hillquit who was a founder of the American 
Socialist Party. Anne Morgan left the league the next day and claimed she had not known about 
the socialists. She then let the press know that the speakers should not teach working girls about 
socialist doctrines, which she viewed as fanatical.86 She is quoted as saying, “It is very 
reprehensible for Socialists to take advantage of these poor girls in these times, and when the 
working people are in such dire straits, to teach their fanatical doctrines.”87  Anne Morgan felt 
sorry for factory girls and thought others took advantage of their lack of intelligence to expose 
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them to socialist teachings. It is another example of how labor allies put their personal ideologies 
above those of the people they supported. 
 Eventually, women not directly affected by the strike became disillusioned with it. The 
turning point came when a settlement was offered that the protesting workers refused. By this 
time, most small shops had already settled and gone back to work. Partway through December, 
the larger factories like the Triangle Factory presented the remaining workers with a settlement 
deal. The proposed deal met all of the workers’ conditions except one. They refused to allow a 
closed shop, which displeased the strikers.  
Workers desired a closed shop for many reasons. If a shop was open, preference would 
be given to workers who were not part of a union. It would be easy for factories to continue 
hiring greenhorn immigrants that would work for anything. Therefore, wages would continue 
being pushed down. The strikers thought a settlement was nothing without the promise of a 
closed shop, because there was no way to ensure businesses followed it.  
The majority of shops workers walked out of created individual agreements with Local 
25. Therefore, shops set their own rates for piecework, contracting systems, etc. and had no 
obligation to follow the settlement made with other businesses. There was no procedure or 
standardization for how the shops should behave after they settled. Almost as soon as the 1909 
event ended, workers reported mistreatment at settled shops.88  
The falling apart of support following the December contract refusal shows how fragile 
the WTUL’s female unity was. Some upper-class women involved genuinely wanted to help 
workers secure better conditions, but others romanticized the strike and the workers involved. 
They imagined using their fine upbringing to educate immigrant workers and then lead them 
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towards female suffrage. The society ladies fell in love with the idea of the unification of 
women, but when the road became rough for the women they were helping, the privileged turned 
their backs and their idealized unity crumbled. 
Without funding from the rich ladies, it became harder for the strike to fund itself. 
Grocers sympathetic to the cause had to stop donating food, because they were nearing 
bankruptcy. In an attempt to gain support and money, Local 25 and the WTUL sent girls door to 
door asking for money. They failed to earn enough to alleviate the pressure on the fund. Another 
method tried was a newspaper drive. Striking girls walked the streets of New York City selling a 
special edition of the New York Call. All of the proceeds from the edition went to the fund. The 
money collected from the newspaper sell was quickly used up. Even though they lacked warm 
clothes, food, and money, girls continued picketing throughout December and January.89 
As winter progressed, the busy season for garment factories came closer. The shirtwaist 
makers and factories became increasingly desperate to break the strike. Owners were willing to 
solve the problem by hiring new workers. Hired policemen protected factories from protesters 
and workers stayed overnight to avoid the determined picketers. Many factories had lunch, 
dancing, and offered fifteen dollar wages to new workers. Of course, all of these amenities 
immediately ceased after the conflict ended. Manufacturers went as far as assembling a blacklist, 
which was distributed in papers. The purpose of the list was to let factory owners know who 
stayed with the strike until the end. It was meant as a punishment, because it prevented workers 




90. Dash, 135. 
 
! 55 
Then there was the Triangle Factory. Like other businesses, they offered perks for those 
who chose to work during the strike. Triangle was about making money and they refused to 
settle with rebellious workers. One point they made clear was they would never agree to an open 
shop. The owners claimed they would employ union members, but they would not create an open 
shop, because it would alienate non-union workers. The factory stated that “[they] sympathize 
with the liberty-loving employee.”91 In reality, the owners never planned on recognizing the 
union. By saying they cared for employees who felt pressured into joining a union, Max Blanck 
and Isaac Harris used the well-being of their workers to cover-up their true plans.  
The Triangle Company opposed having union members as employees long before the 
general strike started, as shown by the previously mentioned September 1909 lockout. Before 
labor unrest kicked up in 1909, the two men had already made attempts at keeping workers in 
check. First, they practiced the contract system. Contracts were used to hire and control shop 
workers. The contractor was given money based on how much product their workers made and 
the contractor then paid the workers.92 Workers could not argue when they received less pay or 
the contractor kept more money for themselves, because contractors had the authority to fire 
workers. In an attempt at appeasement, the Triangle bosses created their own union. It was called 
the Triangle Employees Benevolent Association, but it was a façade. The officers in charge of 
the Triangle union had family relations with the factory owners. Besides appeasement, it was 
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Harris’ fake union fell apart as soon as the original lockout occurred and employees began 
joining real unions.93  
Blanck and Harris continued running the factory run as they deemed it should. They 
encouraged other large factory owners not to give in to the rebellious workers by establishing the 
Allied Waist and Dress Manufacturers Association. The mission of the group was to stop settling 
with the union and its strikers. The Allied Waist and Dress Manufacturers Association was 
created to show the ILGWU that they could not get Triangle and other large firms to surrender. 
By banding together, the large factories presented a unified front against the demands of the 
striking girls. 
The Triangle owners used whatever means necessary to keep their business operating, 
even if it was illegal. Those who to continued working were rewarded with free lunches and 
prizes for dancing. Hired thugs dealt with the most problematic picketers outside the shop. 
Triangle also paid police officers to take dissenting workers to court. If all else failed, the bosses 
had a backup plan. They would create a new factory outside of the city to get away from the 
strike and the union demands that accompanied it.94  
On February 8, 1910, the strike finally ended. Workers’ wish for a closed shop was not 
achieved, but those in charge of Local 25 of the ILGWU settled with the remaining factories by 
agreeing to the deal workers refused in December. The settlement included an open shop 
agreement. Under the leadership of Isaac Harris and Max Blanck, large factories such as Bijou 
and Triangle wore down the union and its members until there was no fight left in them. The 
settlement meant Triangle had to allow their workers to join unions. Nonetheless, they never 
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intended to recognize the unions they belonged to.95 Local 25 and the WTUL continued their 
charade that everything was peaceful with their supporters and members. The fact that the main 
requirement strikers requested was not granted was ignored by leaders in favor of celebrating the 
achievement of women laborers successfully organizing.  
There is no clear indication that the WTUL or Local 25 had a plan for making their 
demands happen. During beginning of the strike, both organizations became overwhelmed by the 
number of workers joining the union. The confusion and overload caused the ILGWU to rapidly 
settle shops on an individual basis. For the untested union, it was a good sign that shops wanted 
to quickly end the disagreement. A few months later, the ILGWU and WTUL realized their 
mistake of not making all shops settle under one deal. Shops signed different contracts, which 
made it hard for the union to note who was disregarding rules after the strike ended. 
When workers refused the December deal, there was no massive regrouping to plan the 
strike’s next move or how they would make up for the lost support of society ladies. Without 
open discussions, the movement quickly deteriorated and the labor groups were forced to end the 
strike. It came down to allowing picketers to starve without money from work or settle for less 
than what they struck for. 
One paper, the Jewish Daily Forward, saw the strike’s outcome in a different light. 
Rather than following the optimistic tone of the organizers, the newspaper published bitter words 
for its readers about the Triangle Factory and their resistance of fair labor conditions: “With 
blood this name will be written in the history of the American workers’ movement, and with 
feeling will this history recall the names of the strikers of this shop- of the crusaders.”96 The 
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Jewish Daily Forward was skeptical about the final agreement. Writers likely heard stories from 
workers about how the Triangle operated and how the factory owners created a sham union for 
employees. The Jewish publication had strong opinions about lower-class workers of their faith 
winning better working conditions, and their words reflect their opinion that the Triangle Factory 
was such a corrupt operation, America’s labor movement would always remember its role in the 
1909 strike. 
Thousands of women joined together during the Shirtwaist Strike to fight for themselves 
and other immigrants trying to live the American dream. Before the walkout, the assumption was 
that women were not capable of striking. The large turnout during the winter months of 1909 
proved that females could organize. Three hundred and fifty-four businesses ultimately signed 
the contract that ended the strike. The work week was reduced from sixty hours to fifty-two 
hours a week, rates for piece work went up twenty percent, and the factory rather than employees 
paid for sewing machines, threads, needles, etc.97   
Along with these main agreements, subcontracting was banned, workers could only work 
two nights a week, holiday pay was established, and a fair system for assigning employees work 
during slack seasons was decided on. New York City gained a reliable union women could join. 
Following the strike, the union would aid workers in finding jobs instead of letting them wonder 
from business to business. Local 25 was no longer threatened by closure and started building its 
operations up to continue their work.98 
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The strike convinced female labor leaders that it was possible to organize women. They 
had been trying to unionize New York’s working women for almost ten years, but workers 
avoided risking their jobs for a union. The 1909 Shirtwaist Strike was proof for labor leaders as 
well as the rest of the country that women were as tough as men and could hold their own on 
picket lines. Prior to the shirtwaist turmoil in 1909, the WTUL was only led by female allies. 
After the contract was signed, allies still claimed the membership majority, but working women 
began holding roles as heads of committees. At the end of the strike, eighty percent of Local 25 
was made of female members. 99  Increases in membership numbers encouraged doubting 
organizers that working women understood how unions benefited them, and wanted their help 
organizing. 
The New York WTUL boasted about having two hundred laborers for members. but the 
league was still mostly made up of middle and upper-class allies. Nancy Schrom Dye suggested 
that the biggest gain was that the labor movement in New York finally saw the benefit of the 
WTUL’s help. Local 25 asked the WTUL to guide them through creating settlements and 
policies for future walkouts, and they elected Rose Schneiderman to their board to show their 
commitment to the WTUL. Rose Schneiderman was a well-respected labor leader born in 
Poland. She was a socialist, suffragette and was passionate about unionizing the Jewish and 
Italian immigrants in the lower East Side.  In return, the WTUL setup its own policies. Instead of 
aiding any union that asked for help, the league permitted two members to serve as delegates on 
a strike committee. Reports from the delegates then decided what aid, if any, was given. 100  
Before 1909, the New York WTUL had aided any strike, because trust was being built between 
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their organization and local unions. Now that the organization had a foothold, the WTUL 
planned on being a guiding source for unions who applied for their help. They could no longer 
hand out their time and money to any trade union. Only unions serious about organizing women 
and doing it in a way the WTUL approved of would receive their help. 
Besides the goal of securing garment workers better working conditions, a portion of 
women involved in the strike also hoped the event would be a unifying moment for females. 
Their unification would demonstrate that class, race, religion, etc. were not barriers. Instead, 
women could form a mutual understanding, overcome their differences, and band together for a 
common good. The situation’s reality was that the unification was never a priority. Leaders 
instead focused on fundraising, appeasing society ladies, and getting picketers out of jail. WTUL 
members shared with the press and public that their sisterhood was strong and would last. 
Leaders, upper-class ladies, and strikers let their differences define them and fuel judgment and 
resentment towards each other. The sisterhood talked about throughout the end of 1909 was a 
false illusion, which dispersed as quickly as the strike. 
Life went on as it had before the strike. Immigrants went back to their derelict factories 
and worked hard for little pay in unsuitable conditions. The WTUL and ILGWU continued 
working together, but their bond was weak. Their mutual hope for organizing women became 
even more diminished by the Cloakmakers’ Strike in July 1910. Unlike the Shirtwaist Strike, the 
Cloak Manufacturers’ Association was prepared for a general strike and already had a plan 
implemented for securing the workers’ needs. After ten weeks, the Protocol of Peace was 
established. Future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis created the protocol as an 
unconventional trade agreement. It formed collective bargaining, better working conditions, 
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etc.101 The Protocol of Peace and how it was utilized by the ILGWU is discussed in the third 
chapter. 
The WTUL and Local 25 began waiting for the next labor struggle to erupt. Both groups 
thought their policies and overall handling of the strike was successful. When the next conflict 
inevitably arose, they would rely on their experience during the Shirtwaist Strike to lead them to 
further success. As 1910 wore on and a new year began, labor organizers avoided reports of 
factories breaking the final contract and workers’ complaints about the lack of a closed shop. In 
the mind of organizers, they had done a good job of earning better protection for workers. They 
knew their work was not done, but they were ready to move on from the Shirtwaist Strike and 
put their experience on using the same methods in other industries. Workers involved in the 1909 
struggle worried the contract was flimsy, and they could not get their representatives in the 
WTUL ignored to their concerns. Factory employees knew the risks they faced working in 
unsafe environments, but they had little choice. They could either work in dangerous spaces or 
walk the streets for charity. The full consequences of the unsatisfactory strike agreement became 
apparent on March 25, 1911, when the workers the WTUL and ILGWU promised to protect 
experienced the most feared workplace accident: fire. 
Part 2 – The Triangle Factory Fire 
O wasteful America! We boast we are clever people, yet go on juggling with youth and its 
dreams.102 
 
Burning heat. Choking smoke. The decision to jump or burn alive. Employees at the 
Triangle Shirtwaist Factory faced this when their workplace caught fire on Saturday March 25, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101. Greenwald, 17. 
 
102. Sonya Levien, “Veteran,” Out of the Sweatshop: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy, ed. 
Leon Stein, (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1977), 137. 
 
! 62 
1911. By the time the bodies stopped falling from the building’s windows; one hundred and 
forty-six people were dead. It was a spring afternoon in New York City and the Triangle workers 
at the factory located on the eighth, ninth, and tenth floor of the Asch building were preparing to 
leave for the day when the fire began. 
The eighth floor of the building housed the fabric cutters of the Triangle operation. Thin 
pieces of the fabric called lawn hung over the cutting tables. Each row of tables had makeshift 
bins for scrap pieces of fabric underneath them. The last time the scraps had been cleared away 
was January 15, 1911.103 Historians including Leon Stein hypothesize a burning cigarette fell 
into one of the bins and started the deadly fire. Smoking was not allowed, but some employees 
ignored the rule. Lawn is extremely flammable and the bins of scraps quickly went up in flame. 
Buckets of water used for such instances were futile. Workers desperately tried dousing the fire 
with a hose from one of the stairwells, but no water came forth. Those who survived on the 
eighth floor escaped down the stairwells. Some went down the fire escape and then busted 
through the windows into the sixth floor. A fireman had to let them out of the locked sixth 
floor.104 
The fire department received the first fire call from the Asch building at 4:45 pm. As 
workers began fleeing the flames on the eighth floor, the manager on the floor tried alerting the 
other two factory floors. The telephone and telautograph available for sending messages only 
connected to the offices on the tenth floor. In order to speak with the ninth floor where the 
majority of sewing machine operators worked, the tenth floor switchboard operator would have 
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to connect them. The ninth floor was never alerted and only discover the dire situation when the 
flames were upon them.105  
Young girls on the ninth floor were giddy when the workday ended. It was payday and 
many had a Saturday evening of leisure planned. The girls went about their routines once the 
quitting bell rang. Their laughter turned into panicked screams as fire and thick smoke entered 
the floor. The open staircase was impassable and workers discovered that the door to the other 
available staircase was locked. Some people pried the shutters off the windows of the fire escape 
and then piled onto its metal stairs. A combination of heat from the fire and the weight of people 
on the flimsy escape led to its collapse. Those trying to escape fell to their death in the courtyard 
below.106  
Another escape route was the passenger elevators. During the day, executives and 
important clients only had access the passenger elevators. After the tenth floor was clear, the 
elevators, operated by Samuel Levine and Joseph Zito, began stopping at the ninth floor. Girls 
pushed their way into the two operating elevators packing them past their capacity. One of the 
elevators stopped making trips once the heat from the fire melted the metal tracks it was on. In 
fear that the other elevator would not return, girls began jumping down the elevator shaft onto 
the roof of the elevator. The weight of all who jumped combined with the people already in the 
elevator pushed it down into the basement where it became stuck and could not return. Some of 
those who jumped in time survived.107 
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Realization hit those still on the ninth floor that their escape options had vanished. They 
were now faced with the choice of jumping to the pavement below or burning to death. By this 
point, they had seen the uselessness of firefighter nets. Those who jumped hit the nets at a force 
of eleven thousand pounds.108 The heavy force sent the bodies through the nets and onto the 
sidewalk. Workers watching from the windows witnessed their coworkers jump to the sidewalk 
and not get back up. The ladders on the fire trucks only reached the seventh floor. Those who 
proceeded to jump knew their families would recognize them in death. The fire could burn them 
until they were unrecognizable, which would make it difficult for their family to identify them. 
At 4:57 PM, the last body fell.109 The fire burned for eighteen minutes and killed one hundred 
and twenty-three women and twenty-three men. The youngest victims were two fourteen-year-
old girls.110  
Factory fires with loss of life frequently occurred during the time period. On November 
25, 1910, a fire occurred in Newark, New Jersey, at a four-story factory building. Most of the 
employees were young women. Six people burned to death and nineteen jumped.111 The Triangle 
Fire was different, because a large audience witnessed it. The Asch Building, now the Brown 
Building, is located in Washington Square. In 1911, many rich families lived in the area. Since 
the fire occurred on a Saturday, people were enjoying a day in the park when smoke appeared 
from the building. Word spread quickly and bystanders watched in helpless horror as people 
began jumping from the top floors of the building.  
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“For many, it became a powerful emotional symbol of what seemed wrong about 
America,” because people were taking notice that lucrative labor was becoming more important 
than human lives.112 Politicians, law enforcement, local leaders, etc. progressively got more 
corrupt as the twentieth century continued, and the public saw it as a sign that American 
standards had been tarnished. The public witnessed what young, immigrant girls fought for in the 
1909 Shirtwaist Strike. There was a difference between reading about factory conditions in 
papers and seeing first-hand how unchecked conditions harmed workers. People who had never 
worked in a factory or struggled to make a living observed what lower-class workers, including 
the ones falling from the Asch Building, risked everyday they went to work. 
The whole city soon heard about the tragedy. Relatives and friends of workers ran to the 
scene in search of people they knew worked at the factory. Curious citizens who had no business 
gawking at the disaster gathered around. Police and medics went through the building collecting 
bodies while others picked the dead off the sidewalks. By the end of the next day, it is estimated 
that fifty thousand people made the trip to the site of the fire.113 
Three days after the fire, a notice appeared in New York City newspapers stating the 
Triangle Company was still operating at 9-11 University Place. An inspection the day after the 
notice ran found that the new headquarters was not a fireproof building. Additionally, two rows 
of sewing machines containing seventy-five machines each blocked a fire exit.114 The company 
was open and blocking fire exits right after it lost one hundred and forty-six workers to fire 
displays the fact that the company valued money over the safety of its employees. 
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The Women’s Trade Union League hosted the largest protest meeting after the fire. On 
April 3, 1911, the meeting took place at the Metropolitan Opera House, which Anne Morgan 
rented for the occasion. The highlight of the gathering came from Rose Schneiderman. The 
young woman worked with the WTUL and aided Triangle workers during the 1909 strike. Rose 
stood in front of those gathered from all parts of New York society and urged them to do 
something about the horrors facing working girls:  
I would be a traitor to these poor burned bodies if I came here to talk good 
fellowship. We have tried you good people of the public and we have found you 
wanting. The old Inquisition had its rack and its thumbscrews and its instruments 
of torture with iron teeth. We know what these things are today; the iron teeth are 
our necessities, the thumbscrews are the high-powered and swift machinery close 
to which we must work, and the rack is here in the firetrap structures that will 
destroy us the minute they catch on fire. 
 
This is not the first time girls have been burned alive in the city. Every week I 
must learn of the untimely death of one of my sister workers. Every year 
thousands of us are maimed. The life of men and women is so cheap and property 
is so sacred. There are so many of us for one job it matters little if [146] of us are 
burned to death. 
 
We have tried you citizens; we are trying you now, and you have a couple of 
dollars for the sorrowing mothers, brothers and sisters by way of a charity gift. 
But every time the workers come out in the only way they know to protest against 
conditions which are unbearable the strong hand of the law is allowed to press 
down heavily upon us. 115 
 
Rose Schneiderman was deeply devastated by the fire. Constantly seeing her working sisters 
harmed in factories made her emotional enough to release her anger and sorrow on the crowd at 
the Metropolitan Opera House. The speech was more than an emotional outburst, it was a plea 
for people across the United States no matter their background, religion, political party, ethnicity, 
etc. to come together and form a solution to stop workplace disasters. 
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Some people lost their entire financial support system in the fire. In an effort to help these 
families, the Red Cross and Local 25 of the ILGWU asked the public for donations. They raised 
$120,000 but only $80,000 was given to affected families.116 The amount given depended on 
how many survivors/deaths a family had. Thorough interviews determined how much aid was 
received. The given money was used for living expenses and funerals. Money was also sent 
overseas to families who had sent members to the United States to work. Families with no deaths 
received ten to one thousand dollars. Families who had a death due to the fire received fifty to 
five thousand dollars.117 
On April 5, 1911, the public came together for a final funeral procession. When it was 
decided no more fire victims would be claimed, seven unidentified bodies remained. New York 
City’s Mayor, William Gaynor, refused the request of the WTUL and ILGWU of overseeing the 
burial of the bodies. He cited the threat of a riot as the reason for his denial. The burial of the 
victims was conducted by the state of New York, but the two groups organized a public funeral 
procession. It was a rainy day, but 400,000 people had either marched in the procession or 
silently watched. Mary Dreier, president of the New York WTUL, Helen Marot, the league’s 
secretary, and Rose Schneiderman were noticeable participants. The procession was separated 
into two crowds. One group started from downtown while the other came from uptown. The two 
became one group at Washington Square where they marched up fifth avenue before disbanding 
at Madison Square Garden. Thousands of people gathered in respectful grief at the gravesite in 
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Cypress Hills Cemetery where the unidentified bodies of six women and one man were laid to 
rest.118  
Martha Bensley, a member of the WTUL, wrote from her window while watching the 
procession. After contemplating the 1909 strike and the fire itself, Bensley talks about how the 
union helped bereaved families. Besides gathering money, they arranged funerals for twenty-one 
victims, gave medical aid, and paid a month’s rent for those who lost their sole money earner.119 
Speaking on more than the tragic loss of employees at the Triangle, Bensley wrote:   
Never have I seen a military pageant or triumphant ovation so impressive; for it is 
not because one hundred and forty-three workers were killed in the Triangle 
Shop- not altogether. It is because every year there are fifty thousand working 
men and women killed in the United States- one hundred and thirty-six a day; 
almost as many as happened to be killed together on the 25th of March: and 
because slowly, very slowly, it is dawning on these thousands on thousands that 
such things do not have to be!120  
 
Martha Bensley’s observations went beyond the funeral procession. The author recognized that 
the fire was part of the United States’ labor problems. The public aspect of the disaster drove 
non-workers to see what factory workers dealt with on a daily basis. These thoughts began with 
the 1909 strike. The fire took it a step further by showing the public that workers do not have to 
die to make consumer goods. Bensley’s article pushed reformers to examine what they had 
already accomplished and what still needed done. 
The Triangle Company had safety warnings before March 25, 1911. In the New York 
University building next door, a professor wrote to the city’s Building Department in November 
1910 that he saw overcrowding and other dangerous activities in the Triangle Factory. He was 
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told an investigation would occur, but it never took place. A man by the name of Mr. H. F. J. 
Porter who was in the business of teaching fire drills at factories contacted Triangle about 
implementing them at the high-rise factory. The company never contacted him back. In an 
interview with the New York Times, Mr. Porter discussed his dealings with factory owners. Some 
places where he taught fire safety stopped using the drill soon after he left. When he had asked 
an owner about the safety of their employees, the man replied, “Let ‘em burn. They’re a lot of 
cattle, anyway.”121 The anonymous quote is yet another example of how early twentieth century 
businesses owners had the horrifying philosophy that the money made from their products 
should be valued over the lives of immigrant workers. 
An inspection was made at the Asch building by fireman Edward F. O’Connor on 
October 15, 1910. He noted that the material used to make the building was fireproof. Pails of 
water were on each floor in addition to a water tank on the roof for emergency use. In 1911, 
before the fire took place, the WTUL disclosed that half of the more than 600,000 factory 
employees in New York City worked on the seventh floor of buildings. The height was taller 
than hoses and fire ladders could reach. Despite all of this, no protective legislation for 
employees or new building codes had been passed that decade.122  
The Triangle Factory also had a history with fires before March 25, 1911. It is thought 
the previous fires had been purposely started for insurance payout purposes. Their insurance was 
worth $199,750 on the day of the 1911 fire. Factory bosses used loopholes to abuse insurance 
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policies and little was done to stop it from happening. When fires meant a company could earn 
money instead of lose it, there was no motivation for up keeping safe workplace practices.123 
In 1902 Max Blanck and Isaac Harris rented the ninth floor of the new Asch building as a 
modern factory space. Around five in the morning on April 5, 1902, a fire broke out on the ninth 
floor of the building. No materials were saved and no one was in the building at the time. The 
same situation occurred on November 1 of the same year. The owners received thirty-thousand 
dollars in insurance money. Along with Triangle, Blanck and Harris owned the Diamond Waist 
Company. Fires occurred in the loft it occupied in April 1907 and 1910. These fires also received 
money from insurance coverage.124  
Journalists and authorities speculated owners started factory fires on purpose for valuable 
insurance claims. All of the previous fires involving the Triangle owners occurred at the end of a 
busy season. With materials left over that money could not be made from, fire was a simple, 
stock clearing solution. Although people had died in the 1911 fire, insurance companies paid 
almost the full amount in lost materials to the Triangle owners. In total, Blanck and Harris gained 
about four hundred and forty-five dollars for every worker killed, which equaled almost 65,000 
dollars.125  
On the evening of the infamous fire, the Triangle Factory owners gave an interview to the 
New York Times. The pair immediately became defensive in preparation to protect them from 
blame even though the interviewer never insinuated they were at fault. Blanck took charge of the 
interview. After explaining how they escaped the fire from the tenth floor, Blanck was asked 
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what the owners had done in the building for fire safety and how employees evacuated in case of 
fire. Blanck informed the interviewer that after previous fires in the building, a guard had been 
hired to patrol at night. Two engineers on staff ensured machine motors had no problems during 
business hours. As for fire escape methods, Blanck said both passenger and freight elevators 
operated all day and could be used during an emergency.  
Blanck also asserted on several occasions during the interview that the factory doors 
always remained unlocked during working hours. Keys to the door were attached to its knob and 
Blanck insisted he checked all doors were unlocked each morning. While referring to the 1909 
strike, Blanck related that they happily followed all of the settlement conditions. The interview 
also said Blanck checked the fire buckets on each floor and made sure they were refilled every 
other day. Each floor also had a fire alarm box installed. A week prior to the fire, Blanck said an 
inspector had visited and found the factory in perfect condition.126 
Although Blanck’s stated he and his partner Isaac Harris were not guilty, on April 12, 
1911, both owners were charged with six counts of manslaughter for the death of two machine 
operators. Only two deaths could go to trial, because the penalty would be the same no matter 
how many deaths actually occurred. New York County District Attorney Charles Whitman was 
convinced the door on the ninth floor was locked. This decided the charges given to Blanck and 
Harris. Investigators discovered a piece of door with a bolt in it on the ninth floor almost a month 
after the fire happened. Keeping doors locked during working hours was a misdemeanor, but 
Whitman intended to prove that the locked door was the reason workers died. If found guilty, the 
factory owners would face a maximum of twenty years in prison. When the case officially began, 
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Whitman singled the manslaughter charge down to one victim, a girl named Margaret 
Schwartz.127 
Blanck and Harris needed the best lawyer and would pay anything for their services, 
because they knew the public was supportive of finding them guilty. Max Steuer was the lawyer 
eventually hired. Steuer was a thorough lawyer who counseled the rich including bankers and 
movie stars. He was involved with Tammany Hall and was known as one of New York City’s 
best lawyers.  
The trial began on December 4, 1911, and ran until December 27, 1911. At the 
beginning, District Attorney Whitman was confident with his witnesses and the evidence of the 
locked ninth floor door. The jury was made up of twelve men who worked in business and trade. 
Many witnesses were forced to speak English during their testimony instead of in their native 
tongue. Steuer did this, because many Americans thought poor English speaking skills meant the 
speaker was not intelligent. Therefore, Steuer was sure jurors would thought the Triangle 
workers “were not smart enough to save themselves.”128 Additionally, Judge Thomas C.T. Crain 
ruled that the details such as the falling and burning bodies during the event could not be used in 
the prosecution’s testimony. District Attorney Whitman failed to anticipate these added factors 
and he had no plan to overcome them. 
The case came down to the testimony of a Triangle worker named Kate Alterman. Steuer 
had Alterman give her account of the fire and the last time she saw Margaret Schwartz three 
times. The lawyer had Alterman tell her testimony more than once to see if any of her story was 
told exactly the same. Alterman’s third time to repeat her story showed that she had repeated the 
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first telling almost word for word the two following times. There is no evidence that those 
testifying truly had been coached by the District Attorney, but the testimony was telling.129  
Before the jurors began their deliberations, Judge Crain spoke to them about the law 
pertaining locked doors and how it should influence their final decision. In order to find Max 
Blanck and Isaac Harris guilty, the jury had to prove the owners knew the door was locked at the 
exact time the supposed murder took place on March 25, 1911. Furthermore, the members of the 
jury needed proof that if the door had not been locked, Margaret Schwartz would have survived 
the fire.130 The judge’s authority over the court influenced the jury into rethinking their opinions. 
The jury debated the case for over an hour before a unanimous acquittal was decided. 
Later, jurors admitted to feeling pressured by Judge Crain and his instructions. One man said he 
knew the public wanted justice and he felt the same way, but he stilled voted for acquittal. Judge 
Crain’s speech about proving if the door was knowingly locked at the time the fire broke out led 
the jury to conclude he was on the side of the defense. By voting for an acquittal, the jurors 
thought they carried out what the judge covertly commanded of them.131  
It is highly possible that Judge Crain was biased when he sided with the Triangle owners.  
Crain was previously the tenement house commissioner for the Tenement House Department. In 
March 1905, a tenement fire in the Lower East Side took the lives of twenty people who could 
not safely make it down the furniture clogged fire escape or out the locked skylight to the roof. 
Crain was blamed for the poor job done by inspectors and was forced to resign from his position 
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scapegoats for the Triangle Fire, because he felt he was the scapegoat for the Allen Street fire. 
Judge Crain had a connection to the owners and wished to protect them and their business from 
ruination.132  
The blame for the fire was put on the Triangle factory owners, but it is clear that several 
factors created the potential for the disaster at the factory. Corners were cut in the building’s 
architectural plans, laws about required working space and locked doors were ignored, and city 
officials failed to ensure factories maintained safe working environments. These circumstances 
created an unsafe workplace, but the WTUL, ILGWU, and 1909 Shirtwaist Strike were outside 
factors that influenced how factory owners controlled their workers and the space they occupied. 
Workers who joined Local 25 during the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike expected the union to 
represent them and make factory owners see their demands as fair and essential for their welfare. 
Factory workers were not only in need of better wages and less demanding work hours, they also 
required better places of work. Improved conditions included: better lighting, more space to 
move, bathroom breaks, proper fire escapes, and unlocked doors.  
The WTUL and Local 25 failed to deal with issues that arose in 1909. Upper-class 
women presented themselves as good citizens by donating their time and money to the cause of 
poor, immigrant women living in New York City. Working-class women resented the presence 
of society ladies, but the WTUL and Local 25 relied on their money to finance the strike and 
would not turn them or their fundraising ideas away. Although these problems were present, the 
WTUL and ILGWU insisted striking was the best method for organizing and gaining workers 




In 1909, Mary Dreier spoke about why the WTUL strongly believed in union 
organization over legislation: “Even while we make laws, let us not forget the more important 
work of organization, for we know that the greatest power to enforce labor laws is trade unions, 
and a strong trade union can demand better conditions and shorter hours than the law will allow, 
and then, too, we get education and power through organization, which we do not get through 
law. ”133 The WTUL mistrusted the state and its proclaimed empathy for workers. State politics 
were full of corrupt officials interested in how to make money from manufacturers while 
elevating their political status. Instead of relying on protective legislation, the WTUL wanted 
women to rely on the national organization, Local 25, and striking to accomplish their goals. 
Mary Dreier’s words illustrate WTUL policy before the Triangle Fire. 
Nancy Schrom Dye relates in her book As Equals and as Sisters, “…the Triangle fire 
demoralized the New York league, for the tragedy dramatized how little progress had been made 
in improving women’s conditions.”134 Finally, WTUL and ILGWU leaders saw their strike 
settlement was not as effective as they thought. If no one listened to what workers and labor 
organizations said during mass walkouts, there was no point in striking.  
Although they failed to secure union recognition in factories across New York City, 
young women still thought labor organizations would protect them. The 1909 strike brought 
awareness to the public about poor working conditions and the Triangle Factory Fire continued 
to stoke outrage. The WTUL and ILGWU may harbored guilt for the Triangle fire. 
Responsibility for the welfare of the young women who paid their dues for union membership 
fell under the organizations. Local 25 and the WTUL acted as pseudo guardians for the girls 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133. Report of the Legislative Committee, Women’s Trade Union League of New York, March 
1911, Women’s Trade Union League of New York Papers, State Labor Library, New York, NY. 
!
134. Dye, 96. 
!
! 76 
when their plight was ignored. The fire was disheartening for labor leaders who had spent the 
last decade attempting to organize women into unions, because they felt they had let down the 
workers they defended. 
Rather than take responsibility for the 1909 strike settlement, the WTUL and ILGWU 
continued arguing with each other over the best policy for organizing women. Local 25 
connected the failure of the 1909 agreement with the occurrence of the Triangle Fire: “The 
victory nearly two years ago of the Ladies’ Waistmakers, Local 25, of New York, has, it appears, 
not been as complete a success as was generally thought at that time; at any rate not a lasting 
success. One of the main reasons for the disappointment is that the agreements originally signed 
with the union were of an individual rather than collective character.”135 The speaker talked 
about the unsuccessful agreement in broad terms. Instead of admitting their strike and settlement 
failed, the speaker in the Ladies’ Garment Worker article said not having a collective settlement 
that recognized the union is the reason the strike failed. It is presented in a way that takes 
responsibility off the union and puts it on the greedy manufacturers.  
Admitting their policies and methods were not successful following the fire would have 
given the WTUL and Local 25 the opportunity to discuss strategies to gain workers’ rights 
together. These tensions plus issues between the different political stances and social classes 
created a situation where the WTUL and ILGWU failed at what their top priority should have 
been: protecting working girls. Working girls dreamed of an independent life in the United 
States, but their gender, status as an immigrant, and low wages that went to support themselves 
and their families held them back. Optimistic working-class girls joined the union, because they 
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thought outside backing was their solution for a less-than ideal life. The Women’s Trade Union 
League and Local 25 of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union failed to protect their 
members, which demonstrates their part in the broken American labor system at the beginning of 























It is unfortunate that the occurrence of a catastrophe is often necessary to awaken a 
people to its true sense of responsibility.136  
 
 The tragedy at the Triangle Factory fundamentally changed how labor leaders and 
organizers looked at unionizing and creating safe work environments. Following the 1909 
Shirtwaist Strike, these leaders felt sure of the direction their organizations and unions were 
heading. In their minds, the strike agreement created strong collective bargaining in the 
shirtwaist trade. Now that they knew they could successfully teach shirtwaist workers about trade 
unions, the next step was spreading their method to other labor sectors. Both the Women’s Trade 
Union League and International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union wanted to spread their ideas 
and striking standards to cities across the United States. After the devastation of the Triangle fire, 
the same leaders saw that their hard work was not as successful as they had spent the last year 
believing. All they had to show for the fight put up during the 1909 strike were the burned bodies 
of girls who had fought on the picket lines in an effort to receive improved conditions in their 
factories. 
As previously discussed, the WTUL and Local 25 of the ILGWU were never able to 
completely agree on the best strategy for organizing women. They wanted workers to unite 
against the problems in factories across New York City, but following the Triangle Fire their 
disagreements continued. Members of the WTUL saw the need for new strategies in securing 
rights for working women while the male-led ILGWU continued advocating for general strikes.  
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 Soon after the Triangle Fire occurred, members of Local 25 began voicing their interest 
in another general shirtwaist strike. Their goal for the walkout was to win women their own 
Protocol of Peace. On September 2, 1910, the Cloakmakers Strike ended with the signing of a 
permanent contract called the Protocol of Peace. The protocol not only had the usual elements of 
minimum wages, fewer hours, etc., it also created the Board of Sanitary Control and a 
Committee of Grievances to settle shop disputes.  Louis Brandeis wanted the protocol to act as 
harbinger of peace between workers and their employers.137 However, “The Protocol [was] a 
treaty entered into between the Manufacturers’ Association and the Union and not between 
employer and employee.”138 Cloakmakers had representation through the protocol, but it put 
them under the will of their shop bosses and union. Shops and unions decided how workers 
should be treated instead of the workers themselves. The ILGWU ignored the concerns workers 
had about the protocol. Since the cloakmakers had successfully installed a labor agreement, 
Local 25 thought it could be repeated in all industrial trades throughout the city.  
While the ILGWU supported a second shirtwaist strike, the WTUL remained wary. 
Strikes were costly and the ladies of the New York WTUL now doubted their effectiveness. 
Factories involved in the 1909 event had already broken the signed agreement and the union 
lacked enough employees to follow-up on complaints filed against them. The ILGWU and Local 
25 were led by males who refused to understand the young women they represented, which 
caused further mistrust among WTUL leaders. Nancy Schrom Dye wrote her opinion that 
“WTUL women… increasingly viewed their difficulties with organized labor as a fundamental 
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conflict between men and women rather than as a conflict between workers and a predominantly 
upper-class organization.”139 During the 1909 strike, there was mistrust over the well-off women 
who made up the WTUL, because the ladies lived different lives than those in New York City 
slums. Still, WTUL organizers thought banding together across class lines would ease the 
suffering of working women. The majority of WTUL leaders came from the upper-class. They 
would never abandon the idea of class unity. 
When the WTUL was created, they modeled several of their core policies after the 
American Federation of Labor. In 1911, the group still stood by the American Federation of 
Labor, because of its no-nonsense qualities. All of its employed board members were male but 
the majority of the WTUL was okay with this, because the AFL ran itself as an organized, 
business machine. Meanwhile, the men who controlled the ILGWU clashed with the WTUL 
mainly because of the difference between an all-male group and an all-female group. 
 One problem with ILGWU male leadership was their refusal to include women in all 
aspects of the union. Men ran the waistmakers’ union, but women made up eighty percent of the 
trade.140 Organizers including Helen Marot thought the lack of male confidence in organized 
women overall weakened the power of the union. A divided union was easy for bosses to exploit. 
Members rationalized that they had no reason to help men with their labor struggle if they 
continued discriminating against their sex. Women who participated in union proceedings were 
mostly given the role of picketing. In the 1909 strike, they were on the frontlines of the labor 
movement being beaten, arrested, and berated by the police and courts. Yet after the strike they 
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still had no executive roles. Women could not continue learning about how to better their place 
in labor if they only had low-level jobs. 
Frustrated with how the ILGWU treated women, Helen Marot wrote to the Jewish Daily 
Forward in 1911, “It is becoming clear to the League that it is a betrayal of the faith and fine 
spirit of the girls to encourage them to organize into trade unions if their union is to be 
dominated by men without business sense or executive ability and by men competent to talk but 
not act.”141 In Marot’s opinion, the men leading the group acted improperly and had no idea how 
to run a union. As Marot saw it, the union men talked about what they wanted to accomplish 
without actually working towards any of their goals. Females joined the ILGWU, because they 
were willing to work for the union and create change in workplaces. They could not actively be a 
part of industrial change if the men in charge were unwilling to give women a place in labor 
reform. 
The lack of diverse roles for women union members barred them from learning about 
union management. Unions, as intended by the WTUL, empowered women workers. It was 
useless to organize women into unions if they were not given the power to create change in their 
shops. Helen Marot wrote, a “misgoverned, badly managed union is worse than no union.”142 
Marot’s letter to the Jewish Daily Forward revealed the prevailing WTUL opinion that the 
ILGWU was unreliable and misgoverned by its male leaders. WTUL leaders such as Helen 
Marot and Mary Dreier understood that policy must include the voices of women members, 
because they were a large part of the workforce. The WTUL concluded that refusing to listen to 
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them would drive women away from unionization, which would damage the progress the WTUL 
had made with organizing women. 
 Even though Marot publically criticized the running of the ILGWU, debate for a second 
shirtwaist walkout continued in New York City. In October 1911, Local 25 officially called the 
second strike. The WTUL provided legal help out of sympathy for their cause and because of the 
bond formed during the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike. Even with the additional help, the protest was not 
successful.143  
At the same time as the second general waistmaker strike, other locals of the ILGWU 
asked the WTUL for help striking against their employers. These locals consisted of white-goods 
workers. The main body of the ILGWU abandoned its other locals in New York City by focusing 
its efforts only on the waistmakers. The international organization was unwilling to give precious 
money to its other workers. With no other choice, these locals turned to the WTUL who 
continued refusing to endorse their mass walkouts. Citing workplace fear after the Triangle Fire 
and the successful turnout for the 1909 strike, these working women were willing to organize, 
but they needed outside support and representation to obtain their own contracts.  
Again, the WTUL recognized that working women needed their help even if they no 
longer supported strikes. Rose Schneiderman vocally supported these smaller groups, because 
she was once one of them. The WTUL began paying her to organize the women as a way to 
avoid a mass strike. Schneiderman said a general strike was the only way for the smaller locals to 
secure better wages and conditions, but she accepted the league’s orders.144  
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At the end of 1912, a final effort was made to establish strikes as the most successful and 
preferred way to gain collective bargaining for workers. Local 62 of the ILGWU began a white-
goods strike, and the WTUL was persuaded to lend its support. The walkout began in January 
1913 and lasted five weeks. During that time, the league helped nearly five thousand young 
women join Local 62.145 It had the numbers to effectively rebel, but not the support the 1909 
protest had. Society ladies and educated college girls showed no support for the white-goods 
workers. Their financial help as well as public interest is what supported 1909 strike and allowed 
it to last for an extended period of time. Without them, the WTUL gave the white-goods fund 
one thousand dollars and only six thousand was donated outside of the union.146 The strike ended 
with the white-goods workers securing a fifty-hour week, a wage increase for piecework, a five-
dollar minimum wage, stopped employees from paying for machine power and thread, and it 
established an industry-wide preferential shop.147 A preferential shop was different from a closed 
one. Louis Brandies explained that in a preferential shop, “The manufacturers can and will 
declare in appropriate terms their sympathy with the union, their desire to aid and strengthen the 
union, and their agreement that, as between union and non-union men of equal ability to do the 
job, the union men shall be given the preference.”148 
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The 1913 strike forced the league to once again consider their relationship with the 
ILGWU and what they had overall accomplished from 1909 to 1913. Included in these 
accomplishments were an examination of their finances, membership gains, how well they had 
educated workers, and if they brought awareness to the public. In 1909, league members gladly 
worked alongside the ILGWU. By 1913, members had developed the complex that they were 
better than the all-male leaders. Their elevated feelings came from their situation as a female-led 
versus a male-led organization. League organizers thought they were pursuing something more 
important, which would have a greater impact than the ILGWU’s continually male targeted 
policies. The haughty attitude of the WTUL only strengthened the dislike between the two 
organizations.  
The league worked to make labor gains for women in all industries, not only the garment 
sector. There is no denying that garment unions had more success and gained more attention 
during the strike era. From 1909 to 1913, garment union membership rose from three thousand 
women to nearly sixty-four thousand women.149 Thousands of women in different industries 
such as tobacco, artificial-flower making, and bookbinding unions did not benefit from 
organizations or strikes during the nearly five years spent on promoting them. 
Since its creation in 1903, the WTUL had been working hard for the inclusion of women 
in labor unions. In reflecting on the strike era (1909 to 1913), league women recognized that 
their AFL modeled policies were not succeeding. One of the original reasons the group joined 
the AFL was because they agreed the organization and its president, Samuel Gompers, were 
serious about organizing women. After a meeting with Gompers in 1915, Margaret Dreier 
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Robins repeated to those present at the 1915 National WTUL Convention the insults the AFL 
president told her about organizing women:  
…the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor recognized the need of 
organizing women, but they did not think women were qualified to organize women, that, 
in the first place, women were very difficult to organize, if they could be organized at all; 
that, secondly, women organizers were rarely worth anything, that they had a way of 
making serious mistakes.150   
 
The conversation between Margaret Dreier Robins and Gompers proved how the AFL and its 
leaders negatively regarded women. Rose Schneiderman put a voice to the thoughts held by the 
WTUL in 1915 when she told the Call, “We [came] to the American Federation of Labor and 
said to them, ‘Come and help us organize the American working girl’…but nothing [has been] 
done.”151 If the AFL was not serious about the objectives of the women leaders, there was clearly 
no reason for the WTUL to continue its support. 
Several women organizers lost interest in organized labor and the labor movement in 
general following the events of the 1909 strike and the horror of the Triangle Fire. The last 
decade was spent attempting to unionize women throughout the nation, specifically in New York 
City, but they never gathered enough workers to stay successfully organized. A lack of 
understanding between classes and ethnicities persisted after the Shirtwaist Strike in 1909. 
League organizers still struggled with Italian and Jewish women who followed their father’s and 
brother’s house-hold rules. Many immigrant women remained wary of trade unions and 
struggled to come out of the shadow of their homeland’s domestic traditions. Organizing the 
diverse population of working women in New York City was not as easy as the optimistic 
WTUL first dreamed. Rather than grassroots campaigns to established organized labor, the 
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remaining women standing with the league such as Mary Dreier and Helen Marot found a 
renewed focus for their work through protective legislation.  
Fire was the factor that pushed the WTUL towards advocating for legislation. After the 
Newark, New Jersey, Fire only four months before the Triangle Fire, the WTUL setup a New 
York City committee to investigate factories and mutually decide how to bring needed change to 
them. Due to the nature of the Newark disaster, the committee first focused on the likelihood of 
factory fires. Many of the girls that responded to the New York league’s survey remained 
anonymous, because they feared their bosses would punish them for testifying. The report 
revealed that most women were afraid of their work environment. In 1910 when the survey was 
given, New York City contained eleven thousand factories. Out of this huge number, it was 
reported that only one hundred were considered fireproof. Being fireproof was not a guarantee 
for the safety of workers. As seen with the Asch Building, it meant the building itself was safe 
from fires, not what was inside them. Circumstances that prevented employees from escaping the 
Asch Building were cited in other factories before the Triangle Fire took place. An alarming 
number of buildings had no water to put fires out, stairs made of wood, faulty or no fire escape, 
and locked doors and windows.152 For league members who pushed against becoming involved 
with legislation and politics, the Triangle Fire quickly changed their minds.  
Shortly after the Triangle Fire, the WTUL came together to further investigate the serious 
issue of factory fires. Uncaring bosses played with the lives of innocent girls, and the league saw 
it as their job to stop workplace disasters. On April 3, 1911, Anne Morgan once again rented out 
the Metropolitan Opera house. The Committee of Twenty-Five was established by the WTUL at 
the assembly to continue the league’s work on fire hazards. It was given its name, because its 
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members consisted of twenty-five of New York’s upper-class citizens. The job of the permanent 
committee was not only to investigate workplace complaints. They also agreed to pressure 
government officials into adopting labor legislation.  
Rabbi Stephen S. Wise commented on why the committee was needed, “We don’t want 
an outburst of charity for those who have suffered only to have the whole thing forgotten in short 
order.”153 Mary Dreier and other allies involved in the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike saw how quickly 
the public moved on from their sympathy for factory workers. Allies could not trust the public to 
ensure factories became safer and a tragedy similar to the Triangle Fire never happened again. 
Instead, the twenty-five on the committee trusted themselves to get the job done. They refused to 
listen to criticism from others regarding the committee. 
People in attendance at the Metropolitan Opera House meeting acknowledged a 
committee was needed, but voiced their dissatisfaction with the established group. Workers were 
not allowed at the meeting. Therefore, their opinions went unheard. Those against the committee 
argued, because the people involved in workplace tragedies, the working-class, had no assigned 
committee role. Members of the WTUL talked about class solidarity, which was one of the 
reasons upper-class women participated in the 1909 strike. Excluding working-class people from 
the committee led some to think the league was no longer serious about the class solidarity they 
spoke of. Those at the meeting who dissented argued that if the people working in hazardous 
environments had no place on official labor committees, they should have their own organization 
or there should be no board at all. 154  
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The barring of those directly affected by working in unsafe conditions from the meeting 
is ironic. It was doubtful beneficial decisions could be made by people who had never worked in 
a factory. Comments circulated about working-class people forming their own committee, but it 
never happened. Outside of the upper-class allies in the labor movement, laborers had little 
influence with the city’s elite. Without the resources to get their committee off the ground, 
suggesting a separate committee was futile. The WTUL always emphasized class solidarity. 
Supporting an exclusively upper-class committee demonstrated that their policy of equality was 
no longer fully followed. 
After the meeting, the New York Times quoted an unknown female WTUL leader as 
saying, “[We] have lost faith in the public and must rely on [ourselves].”155 Although the quote is 
anonymous, it shows how much the ideology of the organization and its leaders had changed 
since the Shirtwaist Strike. Before the Triangle Fire, the organization rallied around unions and 
their efforts to organize women. By 1911, the group of women was no longer optimistic that they 
could successfully organize large groups of women in large cities. Unionization would always be 
a top priority for the league, but they now believed in their own ability to make lasting reform 
rather than working with the public and other organizations such as the American Federation of 
Labor and ILGWU. 
A few weeks after it started, the Committee of Twenty-Five was renamed the Committee 
on Safety. The Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor and its leader John 
Kingsbury made the committee well-known and provided members access to social welfare 
resources. Founded in 1843, the AICP was one of the most successful New York charities in the 





and picketing, the Committee of Safety aimed to lobby for fire related bills that had a chance at 
passage.156 Without government back, the committee never accomplished any of its objectives. 
The WTUL decided the first step to obtaining protective legislation for women was 
through suffrage. Female suffrage was not achieved in the United States until 1920 when the 
nineteenth amendment was officially passed. Prior to its passage, their lack of voting rights did 
not stop women from lobbying for protective legislature. Women in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century became vocal about their rights. Margaret Sanger became a spokesperson for 
reproductive rights, which included birth control.  Charlotte Gilman was a proud feminist who 
wrote about psychological disorders including post-partum depression. Lucretia Mott, Cady 
Stanton, and Susan B. Anthony all had a part in starting the women’s suffrage movement in the 
United States. What is now called the first-wave of feminism was sweeping the country, and the 
messages of strong-females resonated with league members. Discussing feminine issues was 
considered inappropriate in the United States’ conservative society. Women had grown tired of 
their perpetual suppression. WTUL leaders joined the movement with their advocacy for 
suffrage and protective labor legislation. 
Women in the league began to view the issues of working-class women from a feminist 
standpoint rather than as a labor issue. The involvement of women in the American labor 
movement was now about gaining protective legislation for women. Instead of prioritizing class 
over gender, the league now theorized women were at a disadvantage to male workers. 
Protective legislation would assist women in gaining treatment equal to male workers. 
Now that WTUL leaders had spent significant time in the presence of working women, 
they recognized the difference between the sexes instead of treating them all as workers. They 
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heard stories about unwanted advances from employers, struggled with women who gave all 
their income to male heads of house, and saw the tragedy of workplace disasters. Men had to 
endure punishing manual labor such as dock and railroad work and some had to support their 
entire family. Often times, both genders felt embarrassed asking for charity at aid houses. Female 
workers had a different set of problems than men. Once this was realized, the WTUL began 
using these differences as a reason why women needed protective legislation. 
The organization also knew they needed a feminist based platform for why women 
workers needed protective legislation. Leaders who advocated for protection for women in the 
workplace found one major difference to capitalize on: a woman’s biology. Feminists argued 
against putting an emphasis on a woman’s ability to have children, because society already 
considered it a weakness. Leaders still chose to use it as a reason for the need of better factory 
conditions. Emphasizing the differences between men and women was needed and The league 
was willing to make sacrifices to gain protection for women. 
The new platform presented was that women started in the labor force already at a 
disadvantage. According to society, women were destined to be wives and mothers. During the 
early twentieth century, the idea that women were weaker and often felled by their fragile 
emotions was widespread. Emphasis on the perceived weakness of women led men and WTUL 
leaders, including Mary Dreier, to their opinion that women should not be allowed to work in 
places where they had to stand all day, deal with hazardous materials, etc. If they worked in 
situations detrimental to their health, legislation should protect them. Working for a business in a 
high-risk work environment was harmful to a woman’s future. An unhealthy woman may never 
find a husband. Without the support of a family or husband, a woman would be driven to 
working on the streets, which was a fate organizers wanted a woman to never experience. If a 
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woman was healthy enough after leaving factory life, there was still the chance that those who 
had worked closely with chemicals and other hazards would have issues with child bearing. It 
was agreed that children should not suffer in life, because their mother was forced to work in an 
unsafe environment. 
Late in 1916 Mary Dreier discussed her change of views on the league’s strategy to 
Leonora O’Reilly. In writing, Dreier said, “The attitude of the labor men to the working women 
has changed me from being an ardent supporter of labor to a somewhat rabid supporter of 
women and to feel that the enfranchisement of women and especially my working-class sisters is 
the supreme issue.”157 In the beginning, WTUL organizers saw feminism as a non-issue. The 
league’s focus was on organizing women into trade unions, not gaining the vote or establishing 
that men and women are equal. Even with this ideology, the group recognized that women 
workers were different from their male counterparts. 
Following the strike era, women labor organizers had a better understanding of how 
politics and legislation worked. They knew that politicians under political machines including 
Tammany Hall were part of the government’s failure to adopt protective legislation for workers. 
Women such as Rose Schneiderman lobbied for the fifty-four-hour bill in 1912, which was 
meant to establish the work week at fifty-four hours for women and children in New York. 
Thanks to Frances Perkins’ work with Alfred E. Smith, who was a part of Tammany Hall and a 
member of the New York State Assembly, the bill was eventually passed. Rose Schneiderman 
and other female lobbyists became pessimistic, because of their treatment at the hands of male 
politicians. Their views were not taken seriously, because women could not vote. Some women 
labored their lives away in derelict factories, but men held the belief that without voting rights, 
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their experiences and opinions were invalid. At the same time, men discouraged votes for 
women, because they saw them as less intelligent than men and led by their emotions rather than 
logic. Before the nineteenth amendment, women relied on men to vote for bills related to female 
issues. By receiving the ability to vote, labor women speculated that their call for protective 
legislature would be heard by the all-male political scene. 
Clara Lemlich explained the inherent problem of working women not having the vote in 
1912 when she wrote: 
The manufacturer has a vote; the bosses have votes; the foremen have votes; the 
inspectors have votes. The working girl has no vote. When she asks to have a building in 
which she must work made clean and safe, the officials do not have to listen. When she 
asks not to work such long hours, they do not have to listen… For until the men in the 
Legislature at Albany represent her as well as the bosses and the foremen, she will not get 
justice; she will not get fair conditions. That is why the working-woman now says that 
she must have the vote.158 
 
Suffragists including the Dreier sisters had one strong justification for women suffrage and they 
spread their message throughout the slums of New York City. If women received the vote and 
then used its power wisely, men may start listening and following their proposed labor reforms. 
The establishment of the WTUL showed that women desired to become part of the male-
dominated American labor movement. The men’s lack of interest in women’s issues as well as 
the failure of sponsorship from the American Federation of Labor drove women organizers, 
especially the WTUL, towards feminism and all-female organizations. Women were a minority 
in the inner-circle and decision making of the early twentieth century labor movement, but 
WTUL women began shaping their policy to match this fact.159  
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The Triangle Fire served a purpose for labor organizations, specifically the WTUL and 
ILGWU. Although it was a devastating event, it showed these organizations that they could not 
solely rely on the strategy of mass strikes in garnering working conditions. At the same time, it 
opened the eyes of women in the league. Until this time, they had dutifully followed the AFL. 
Following the example of male-led organization was not beneficial. The men made empty 
promises, gave little funding, insulted women organizers and ignored their concerns. Instead of 
passively struggling with men on political and labor issues, league members began actively 
changing the way they ensured working-class women received fair treatment in their workplaces.  
Female organizers in the WTUL still followed their original vision of women united 
across class, religious, and ethnic lines after switching to supporting protective legislation. The 
Dreier sisters, Rose Schneiderman, and other supporters of organized labor only change their 
thinking about how women unionization could successfully be achieved. Organization was 
always their primary job. Following the 1911 fire they regarded government legislation as a 
successful way to reform workspaces and keep women firmly united in unions. Without strikes 
to bring women to the unions, hope was now pinned on the theory that legislation would start a 
domino effect among working women. Schneiderman explained the new strategy by 
commenting, “We only began to stress legislative activities when we discovered… a stepping 
stone cause and effect relationship in the American labor movement. If we organized even a 
handful of girls and then managed to put through legislation which made into law the advantages 
they had gained, other girls would be more likely to join a union and reap further benefits for 
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themselves.”160 The WTUL still used the principle of spreading their assistance by word of 
mouth, but strikes no longer had a place in the operation. 
Meanwhile, the male-led ILGWU still advocated for strikes. The organization and its 
unions in New York City were still riding high from the 1910 Protocol of Peace. Following the 
Triangle Fire, factory workers’ demands for walkouts increased, because they feared sharing the 
same fate. The Waist and Dressmakers’ Union of New York, Local 25, was the first union to 
petition for another strike. The ILGWU affiliate related that enthusiasm for unionization among 
workers was created through strikes. Similar to the WTUL, Local 25 saw through the Triangle 
Fire that their 1909 agreement created no lasting change. Despite the disappointment of their first 
strike, Local 25 relied on it as their main strategy unlike the New York league who quickly 
created new reform tactics. As the league found, the all-male organization was a detriment to 
working women earning a place in American labor. Their indifference to workers who fell 
outside of their mostly socialist and Jewish membership created a rift between the two 
organizations. The ILGWU knew women were the majority of the garment trade and should be 
included in their operations, but the group only wanted women as picketers. Delegating women 
to a front-line role would keep them out of executive roles, which male organizers vehemently 
said women were not intelligent enough to handle.  
Rose Schneiderman, who was also part of the WTUL, worked for the ILGWU for three 
years as an organizer. After months of working with Boston’s shirtwaist makers in 1916, 
Schneiderman convinced the president of the ILGWU that the women were ready to walkout of 
their jobs. When the president decided at the last minute that a man should lead the strike instead 
of a woman, Rose wrote out her anger to Pauline Newman: “They have got to be taught… that a 
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woman is no rag. Think of doing all that worrying and planning and when the task is almost done 
to send a man in and give him the credit for building up the thing.”161 Following the incident, 
Schneiderman left the ILGWU and channeled all of her passion into running the national league. 
The ILGWU spent less effort on women workers than on the immigrant, male socialists 
in the United States. Thanks to the Protocol of Peace, the organization tried implementing the 
same policies of the protocol in industries made of mostly women workers. When dress-makers 
agitated for a general strike at the end of 1912 and voted for it in January 1913, the ILGWU 
swiftly created a protocol. It started on January 14 and on January 18 the protocol for the mostly 
female industry was signed by the ILGWU and the Dress and Waist Manufacturers’ Association 
without the workers’ consent. At the same time, kimono makers and white-goods workers also 
struck. Local 41 and 62 both declined several agreements before the manufacturers gave in to the 
idea of a preferential shop and signed their own protocols with the ILGWU.162 
The union had a grand dream of creating protocols for men and women throughout 
America’s major cities. Its ambition for protocols for women spread to Boston and Kalamazoo, 
but it never had a far-wide reach for either gender. The waistmakers of New York, particularly 
Local 25, had the most success with the protocol. All shops that were part of the protocol 
included a white label in their garments to let consumers know the item had been made in a shop 
that followed the protocol and standard factory conditions.  In the organization’s opinion, a 
protocol for women’s industries was a way for working women to unionize and exercise their 
right to collectively bargain. Additionally, the international stated the protocol would bring the 
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“frailest and most helpless” workers “relief from industrial slavery.”163 No matter a worker’s job, 
race, gender, etc., the protocol would save them from the dangerous prison workplaces had 
become. 
Essentially, the ILGWU saw the protocol as a way to give working women an 
opportunity to rise above their workplace oppression. In reality, the protocol was not an effective 
change. Preferential shops as described earlier by Louis Brandeis were an idealistic fantasy. 
Shop owners still hired non-union workers over more qualified organization members because 
they refused to recognize the groups. Protocolism gained few converts beyond the northeastern 
United States and the only truly successful agreement was the original 1910 Protocol of Peace. It 
was a promising new strategy, but the Protocol of Peace had its own set of issues. The ILGWU 
did not actively lobby for legislation like the WTUL. Instead, they relied on their members and 
the word of factory bosses to reform American labor. It was the least impactful organizational 
strategy following the Triangle Fire. The group gave its working-class members hope and has 
left its mark on American labor history, but it failed to adopt successful reform methods 
following the 1911 tragedy. 
While the New York WTUL was working on their own campaign for protective 
legislation and the ILGWU created protocols, the Factory Investigating Commission led its own 
labor crusade. The commission passed was formed by the New York State legislature on June 
30, 1911. It was made as an official body in charge of fully investigating the conditions of 
factories and its employees throughout the state. The state gave the commission permission: “to 
inquire into the conditions under which manufacturing is carried on in cities of the first and 
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second class of the State to the end that remedial legislation might be enacted for the protection 
of life and health of all factory workers, and for the interests of the public generally.”164  
Officially, the FIC was established to investigate factory fire hazards. The commission 
swiftly changed their goals to evaluate all aspects of factory life after their first investigations. 
The commission reported, “A superficial examination revealed conditions in factories and 
manufacturing establishments that constituted a daily menace to the lives of thousands of 
working men, women and children… The need for a thorough and extensive investigation into 
the general conditions of factory life was clearly recognized.”165 After their first year, the 
commission moved on from legislation for typical issues such as women, children, and fire 
safety. The following three years saw them submitting bills for fair employment, disabilities, 
sanitation, and insurance for older workers. 
From the beginning, the commission was under the control of Al Smith and Robert F. 
Wagner of Tammany Hall. Al Smith joined the political scene in New York as a member of the 
New York State Assembly in 1904. After meeting with Frances Perkins, Smith became active in 
reforming New York labor. Later, he served as the Governor of New York from 1919 to 1920 
and 1923 to 1928. In 1928, Smith was the Democrat candidate for president of the United States. 
Although he was involved with Tammany Hall, Smith avoided its corruption and never 
developed an unfavorable reputation. 
Similar to Al Smith, Wagner started as a member of the New York State Assembly in 
1905. From 1909 to 1918, he was a New York State senator. Working on the FIC gave Wagner 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
164. "Report of the New York State Factory Investigating Commission,” Monthly Review of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics no. 2, (1916). 
!
165. New York (State) Factory Investigating Commission, Preliminary Report of the Factory 




the reputation of a Progressive Era reformer. From 1927 to 1949, Wagner served as a Democrat 
in the United States Senate. Both Smith and Wagner helped Tammany Hall turn itself into a 
progressive body with a large working-class backing. 
 Following the Triangle Fire, Smith and Wagner realized Tammany needed to get 
involved in the reform movement its immigrant voters supported in order to stay a top machine. 
New York City had a large immigrant constituency and the politicians agreed immigrants would 
not willingly vote for Tammany-backed candidates if they showed no interest in the safety of the 
working-class.  
Samuel Gompers, the long-time president of the American Federation of Labor, was also 
a FIC board member. Today, Frances Perkins is the most recognized person involved in the FIC. 
She witnessed the Triangle Fire and created a name for herself through the commission. Perkins 
was an activist for workers’ rights and served as the Secretary of Labor under Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. The WTUL inadvertently had a hand in the FIC, because several of its members 
worked for the commission. Clara Lemlich and Rose Schneiderman served as investigators. 
Mary Dreier was the only female FIC board member. All of these women had worked in or seen 
factory conditions and the people who worked in them. They badgered their male colleagues to 
investigate factories and interview employees themselves rather than reading over reports from 
others. 
The FIC only lasted four years, but it was more successful at establishing legislature than 
the national WTUL its New York branch ever were. Of course, that is because the commission 
was sanctioned by the New York government. Unlike other groups, the FIC had access to 
resources and prominent political figures. Its first year, the commission tested the labor waters in 
New York’s major cities with ten thousand dollars allotted for the work. Over three thousand 
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pages of testimony was taken from all of their factory investigations, public hearings, and 
interviews. By the end of the 1912, the FIC gave fifteen bills to the New York legislature for 
consideration. Eight of the bills were passed.166 In 1913, twenty-five laws created by the 
commission were passed and three more followed the next year. New York’s Republican party 
was able to cut off funding for the FIC in 1915, which led to its dissolution.167 
The commission used the Triangle Fire at the Asch building as the foundation for their 
work. They related that if measures were not quickly and efficiently created, another Triangle 
Fire would occur. Its first meeting on October 14, 1911, included interviews with New York Fire 
Chief John Kenlon, the Commissioner of Labor, and an inspector from the State Labor 
Department. These interviews consisted of discussions on the cost of fire protection such as 
sprinklers and the major flaws with the Labor Department’s investigation system. The 
commission’s male and female investigators were serious about their job, and it showed through 
their thorough searches of factories and sweatshops. No corner was overlooked and investigators 
often caught bosses unaware when they arrived for a surprise inspection. 
At the fiftieth anniversary of the fire in 1961, Frances Perkins emotionally spoke to those 
present about the reason for the FIC and its lasting legacy: 
Out of that terrible episode came a self-examination of stricken conscience in which the 
people of this state saw for the first time the individual worth and value of each of those 
146 people who fell or were burned in that great fire… Moved by this sense of stricken 
guilt, we banded ourselves together to find a way by law to prevent this kind of disaster. 
And so it was that the Factory Commission that sprang out of the ashes of the tragedy 
made an investigation that took four years of searching, of public hearings, of legislative 
formulations, of pressuring through the legislature the greatest battery of bills to prevent 
disasters and hardships affecting working people… We had in the election of Franklin 
Roosevelt the beginning of what has come to be called a New Deal for the United States. 
But it was based really upon the experiences that we had had in New York State and 
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upon the sacrifice of those who, we faithfully remember with affection and respect, died 
in that terrible fire on March 25, 1911. They did not die in vain and we will never forget 
them.168 
 
The Triangle Fire was the driving force behind the FIC, but the commission showed its 
awareness of negligence in all of New York’s industries. Through the hard work and moral 
awareness of everyone involved with the FIC, the commission was a success that not only set an 
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 From 1903 to its gradual dissolution, the women who worked for the Women’s Trade 
Union League always had ambitious goals. It started with unionization and gradually added 
suffrage, protective legislation, and, near the end, participation in the equal rights amendment. 
Following its fame from the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike and presence in reforming labor laws, the 
WTUL and industrial feminism slowly disappeared.  
 The overwhelming focus on the new communist presence in the United States rather than 
the betterment of working conditions had consequences. Overall, the International Ladies’ 
Garment Workers’ Union lost seventeen thousand members during the first four years of the 
1920s. At the beginning of 1920, women made up seventy-five percent of ILGWU membership. 
By 1924, it had dropped by thirty-six percent. Throughout the first half of the 1920s, 45,000 
women quit the organization and 20,000 men joined.169 The union was never able to recover 
from declining membership figures among females. In the early twentieth century, women 
expected the ILGWU to adequately represent them. By the 1920s when their desired 
representation was still not fully realized and the male-led group continued putting their needs 
last, women gave up hope on the organization that had originally guided them through the 1909 
Shirtwaist Strike. 
 In the 1930s and after the Second World War, the WTUL allowed female Congress of 
Industrial Organizations members to join them. Until 1938, the group was called the Committee 
for Industrial Organization and was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Once the 
group broke from the AFL, officials punished the WTUL for fraternizing with a now rival group. 
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Even with the financial threat, women in charge, including Rose Schneiderman and Pauline 
Newman, continued allowing CIO members to join while never addressing the situation. As 
discussed, the league knew from the beginning that they needed the AFL to ensure their own 
success. Unlike the early 1900s, it no longer passively followed AFL directives. In 1940, Rose 
Schneiderman said, “We will organize women where it is necessary. We will work with the 
AFL, we will work with the CIO.”170 League organizers no longer cared if they associated with 
AFL antagonists. The league was already financially struggling to stay active and were desperate 
for the dues new members would bring.  
 The league’s response to the AFL’s demands concerning the CIO made its financial 
situation worse. Instead of issuing a blanket response, the president of the National league and 
New York branch, Rose Schneiderman, occasionally acted out against the CIO. In 1937, she 
refused an aid request to a CIO union and no league member was present at the CIO convention 
in 1938. Again, these sporadic decisions made union leaders and their members question the 
WTUL. Branches were angry over the lack of response from the national board when the AFL 
targeted them over the CIO issue. At the same time, the CIO stopped giving donations to the 
WTUL. The lack of decisive leadership from board members was the first sign of the league’s 
decline. 
 Over the next decade, the league continued slipping into a poverty it could not recover 
from. Women who held executive roles in state branches quickly resigned as it became clear the 
league was dying. The league had problems getting young women to join their cause and its 
original members and leaders left the organization for retirement. In 1950, the national WTUL 
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voted to officially close the league. The New York branch, which was the champion of the 
league, continued operating until 1955.  
The league’s first members witnessed the height of sweatshops in America and the 
gradual adoption of safe work place practices for all workers. The United States now had a 
minimum wage, a forty-eight-hour work week, and unionization was recognized by the federal 
government.171 The WTUL’s purpose was to organize women in a way that included all classes. 
By the official disbandment of the league, the organization had lost its original purpose and the 
spirit that drove its leaders. Uniting women across class lines was no longer what created passion 
among organizers. The switch to recognizing feminist ideologies led the group away from 
overcoming class, religious, ethnic, and political differences among allies and working women. 
Leaders gave into the notion that women would never receive equal pay with men or become 
high-skilled workers. By the end of the league, disagreements with allies, women workers, the 
AFL and ILGWU, etc. throughout the league’s history had fundamentally changed its goals and 
what it stood for. 
 While the WTUL struggled towards its end, the ILGWU grappled with its own issues, 
which led to its abandonment of women’s issues. Following the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike and the 
Triangle Fire, the National group and Local 25 of New York had concentrated their efforts on a 
universal Protocol of Peace. A war among members in the organization quickly changed its 
ability to run an effective union. Women’s issues were set aside by the male-led organization in 
favor of the struggle between left and right political factions among members. Socialist 
immigrants started the organization and their socialist ideologies became imbedded with its 
leaders and the organization’s policies. The growing presence of communist members and low-
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level leaders in their locales horrified upper-level leaders. Starting in 1923, leaders declared war 
on several of its affiliates and local branches including the Trade Union Education League. The 
National organization asked members to leave unions considered overran by communists. The 
members who refused to leave were expelled.172 Once again, women took notice of how male 
leaders treated them. Leaders ignored their concerns and there was still no female officer on the 
international board.  
A few decades later, large shops and factories in the United States began relocating 
abroad where sweatshops could still be taken advantage of. The ILGWU began having trouble 
organizing manufacturers who by the 1950s were centered in the western United States. In 1995, 
the organization joined the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union to create UNITE 
HERE, which still operates today. The labor union works in North America, has almost 300,000 
members, and has a majority membership of women and people of color. UNITE works with a 
variety of industries besides garment and textile trades. A few other industries under the UNITE 
umbrella include: food services, hotels, laundry, and transportation. Every year the organization 
holds a remembrance ceremony in front of the former Asch building where the Triangle Fire 
took place. The name of each victim and their age is read. Many descendants attend the 
ceremony with makeshift shirtwaists, which also read the victims’ names. The ceremony’s 
purpose is not only to remind and educate people of the past, but also to ensure the public 
remains aware of the struggle for workers-rights.  
The Women’s Trade Union League and International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union 
have a legacy that goes beyond the foundations their dedicated leaders established as part of the 
American labor movement. Their legacy is entwined with the horror and lessons learned from 
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the Triangle Factory Fire. The WTUL and its move towards legislative advocacy following the 
fire changed the traditions of the American labor movement and how labor-related protests were 
conducted. The organization successfully inserted itself into American politics, which had not 
been done before. Without the publically witnessed Triangle Fire, the league would not have 
rallied around legislation. Its leaders such as Mary Dreier and Helen Marot created a new 
precedence for how unions and their national organizations demanded proper conditions for 
workers no matter their ethnicity, gender, etc. Instead of taking to the streets in protest, women 
lobbied for female suffrage and protective legislation for women and children workers. The 
WTUL never achieved the class unity it originally sought, but it opened the eyes of thousands of 
immigrant, working women as well as the general American public to the plight of the working 
girl. Their public involvement during the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike and outrage following the 
Triangle Fire inspired and educated the masses.  
The ILGWU in its original form left a strikingly different legacy behind for women 
organizers and workers. Members of the group felt deep sympathy for the girls who had picketed 
for Local 25 during the 1909 strike and then lost their lives a year later at the Triangle Factory. 
The mostly male group fail to channel its anger over the fire into creating new policies. The 
WTUL slowly edged away from mass strikes while the ILGWU embraced walkouts and 
attempted a universal Protocol of Peace. For the most part, the group’s involvement in the lives 
of working women was a tool used to gain more members. Once women realized the ILGWU 
was never going to support them the way they supported male members, they quickly quit. The 
labor organization is a prime example of an organization that lacked solid representation for its 
female membership. Their pursuit of a protocol recognized across all industries and its special 
attention to socialist members is the ILGWU’s legacy following the Triangle Fire. 
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 Why is analyzing the effect of the 1909 Shirtwaist Strike and Triangle Fire on early 
twentieth century labor organizations important? The simple answer is that it still is important, 
because unsafe factories are still a global problem, especially where manual labor is cheaply 
purchased. Disasters similar to the Triangle Fire will never stop as long as bosses and officials 
choose products and money over their workers. An example eerily similar occurred in 2012 in 
Karachi, Pakistan. On September 11, 2012, a fire broke out at a garment factory owned by Ali 
Enterprises. Many workers at the factory only came in that day to receive their paycheck.  
 Mohammed Pervez, a survivor of the incident, commented on the fire risks employees 
dealt with every day, “If there were no metal grilles on the windows, a lot of people would have 
been saved. The factory was overflowing with garments and fabrics. Whoever complained was 
fired.”173 People also jumped out of open windows in the four story building to save themselves 
from the flames. In the factory that employed at least 1,500 people, it is estimated two hundred 
and eighty-nine people died in the fire. Several bodies were unidentifiable, because they burned 
beyond recognition. 
 Shortly after the disaster, an investigation into the cause of the fire and the reason 
workers could not escape began. It is speculated that a faulty electric circuit started the blaze. 
Reports from workers included in the joint investigation court said they never had fire drills and 
medical kits were locked away, because the owners said workers would steal them. Furthermore, 
the fire department arrived at the scene of the fire seventy-five minutes after it began.174 
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 Mohammed Pervez said in his interview, “The owners were more concerned with 
safeguarding the garments in the factory than the workers.”175 It is clear the factory owners, 
Abdul Aziz, Arshad Bhalia, and Shahid Bhalia, cared more about money than the people who 
made their products. The trio fled to London, England after paying bail during the factory case. 
As of 2015, they still resided in London.176 
Similar to the United States in the early twentieth century, Pakistan has a booming labor 
industry relegated to unsafe factory buildings. There are few labor laws and these are ignored by 
business owners. Factory inspectors do not report issues, because they are paid off by corrupt 
bosses. The New York Times noticed the fire’s similarity to the Triangle Factory Fire in its 2012 
article on the Karachi fire by writing: 
There was evidence that Ali Enterprises was flawed well before September’s fire. 
Abdulrauf Shaikh, a longtime inspector, examined the factory three times, in 2010, 2011 
and again this July, just two months before the fire. Each time he found a locked fire exit 
— as in the fatal 1911 Triangle shirtwaist factory fire in New York — minimum wage 
violations and other serious problems.177 
 
To further illustrate the prevalence of factory fires today. Hours before the Karachi fire, twenty-
five workers died at a shoe-sole making factory in Lahore, Pakistan. Remembering the Triangle 
Fire and encouraging global labor unions is important, because horrific factory tragedies will 
keep happening unless labor leaders continue demanding protective legislation, which their 
predecessors in the Women’s Trade Union League began. Technology has rapidly evolved since 
the early twentieth century, but employees across the world are still treated like immigrants in 
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the United States during the 1900s. If no one stands beside them in solidarity, the labor 
movement will permanently fail. 
The WTUL and ILGWU were not the first labor organizations in the United States, but 
the Triangle Fire forced them to think outside of the policy box created by the AFL. Both had 
different goals and groups they represented, but they ultimately introduced new labor strategies 
that changed how the labor movement looked. Thanks to these organizations, today’s unions 
have learned from past strategies and mistakes while continuing the practice of trying new 
methods for successful organization. No matter what shocking roadblocks labor organizations 
come across, they must pursue their goals until workers across the United States are treated 
fairly. Standing firm through adversity in the name of making certain all workers are treated with 
respect no matter their job title honors the memory of the league and ILGWU. Their work is not 
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